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MANKIND

QUARTERLY

— mala opinio bene parta delectet —

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CONTENTS

NORTHERN EUROPEAN ELEMENTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
by R. Gayre of Gayre 63

THE NEW FANATICS
by William A. Massey 70

LEGAL TESTIMONY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: A CONTRAST
by C. P. Armstrong, S. S. Crutchfield, W. E. Hoy and R. E. Kuttner 105

DOBZHANSKY'S "EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY" CONCEPT
by H. George Classen 111

BOOKS RECEIVED 117

BOOK REVIEWS 118

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NORTHERN EUROPEAN ELEMENTS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

By R. GAYRE OF GAYRE

The geographer's historical and traditional division of the land masses into Europe, Africa and Asia has been most unfortunate as far as the understanding of the ethnology of the Mediterranean basin is concerned, for it has led Europeans to think of the peoples of Anatolia and Palestine as orientals and those of northern Africa as black peoples. An instance of the latter is found in Shakespeare's play *Othello*, in which the Moor of Venice is always shown as a black man. It is also indicated in European heraldry where the charge *a blackamoor's head,* that is a "black Moor's" head, is always depicted as a black Negro's head. Yet the Moors are a part of the general ethnology of Northern Africa, and are by no means to be considered Negroid and black.

The whole of the Mediterranean is a geographical unity and also a racial continuum, for it cannot be repeated too frequently that seas do not divide; on the contrary, they are highways which link together opposite shores. Even when the seas are as vast as the Pacific and Indian Oceans they form the means of contact between distant lands. That is how Malay elements reached Africa in pre-European times, and with them came the yam which caused the population explosion of the Negroids. As far as the Mediterranean was concerned it was for a long period the ambient of the Mediterranean race, whether we consider the peoples of the northern, southern, or western shores. Along the northern shores of Africa, impinging upon the Mediterranean stock, there were, however, considerable Atlantic elements, some of which are still there. In Anatolia, Palestine, Greece and even further west there were Nordic strains from the north. In addition, especially in the eastern half of the Mediterranean, we come upon intrusive Armenoid and Dinaric elements.

It is important to realise that all these races are and have always been Caucasoid, and the peoples derived from them still remain Caucasoid to the present time. Thus, in the Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans and Egyptians, and in the Arabs of Palestine, Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon, we may be dealing with Moslem populations but, for all that, they are Caucasoids, and so they are brought to one's notice when travelling from Black Africa to of the same basic stock as the Europeans. This is most strikingly Northern Africa, where the European or Caucasoid character of

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these peoples becomes strikingly evident. But, because of general ignorance, now as in the time of the mediæval armorist or the Tudor playwright, the general conception is that the peoples of North Africa are to be equated with or approximated to the Negroid populations which lie to their south. So much is this the case that there is a large-scale anti-White propaganda campaign at the present time based on these very errors, which seeks to show that civilisation came from the "Black" north African countries when the "Whites" were savages in Europe. The implication of this distorted racial history (which contains a series of fallacies into which we cannot enter here) is that the peoples of Libya and Egypt, to take two concrete examples which are frequently quoted, were Negroids or Black races of some kind who were more advanced at one time than were the White races of northern and central Europe. Such propaganda deliberately ignores the fact that all the peoples of northern Africa were Whites. We may also add in passing that it omits to note that the ancestors of many of the European peoples of today came from these very countries—this is certainly true of the forebears of the peoples of the Celtic fringe of Europe, who share the blood of the founders of the megalithic cultures which came from the Mediterranean. Indeed, it is even probable that languages having affinity to Hamitic were being spoken in north-western Europe till quite late (perhaps even till the Roman conquests in the north) before they were overwhelmed by the Indo-European Celtic tongues.

Recently the writer visited the Christian Arab communities of Palestine, as the guest of Archbishop Hakim, Catholic Archbishop of Galilee.[1] In company with the Archbishop, and the Superior of the Seminary at Nazareth, the writer was able to visit some of the remoter villages of Galilee where there are Christian communities. Unfortunately these have been considerably reduced as a rsult of the war between the Jews and the Arabs.[2] As a consequence of this the Christian Arab population has been halved and, indeed, there are considerable grounds for disquiet concerning the survival of Christianity in the Holy Land.[3]

[1] The Catholic rite in Palestine is not Roman Catholic, but has an Arabic liturgy, and in earlier times used Greek. The Roman Catholics in Palestine are, in contradistinction, called *Latins*.

[2] No fewer than over 200 Christian Arab villages have been destroyed by bombing, or by bulldozers subsequently, and furthermore some of the Christians' best lands have been expropriated by the Israeli government.

[3] The restrictions placed upon the free settlement of Christian Arab communities must have the effect of restricting the re-growth of the Christian Church to its former proportions. Thus, in Tiberias, Christian Arabs were driven out and they are not allowed to return. The Arab quarters of Haifa have been substantially destroyed and, again, the people have not been allowed to return to the houses or the sites to claim or rebuild them.

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While the characteristics of the Arabs as a whole tend to show a strong Mediterranean influence, although both Nordic and Armenoid are not absent, when we come to consider these Christian Arab communities in the hill villages of Galilee we find a people whose traits belong to present-day northern and central Europe. They are basically a Nordo-Dinaric people, the majority of whom have very fair, often ruddy, complexions, long faces, Dinaric "Roman" types of noses, or normal long Nordic noses, and narrow skulls, whether their heads are in fact dolichocephalic or not. What is particularly striking is the relatively large number who have grey or blue eyes. Some of the adults even have yellow hair and, as might be expected, this trait is found with even greater frequency among the children. The aquiline noses of the Armenoid and Mediterranean types are found less frequently than among the Moslem Arabs or the Jews. To sit down at a feast in one of these villages with men in Arab headdresses, but with these astonishingly northern and central European features under them, forceably reminds one of how little relationship there is between culture and race in this instance.

In the Lebanon the same type is well marked among the Druses, and it has often been said that these strains are derived from the Crusaders. This is, however, largely apochryphal. Of course, the Crusaders have left some mark. They occupied Palestine where they established a Kingdom divided into baronies, and many of the Christian European barons of Palestine became as native as the indigenous people they had conquered. As a result some reinforcement of northern European racial types would have occurred—but the fact remains that since Palestine was long settled by Nordic and related stocks (as we have shown in a previous paper) it is much more reasonable to look to these indigenous sources for the main element of Nordo-Dinaric strains in the existing Christian Arab populations.

Although the Armenoid type is not absent among the Christian Arabs of Galilee, it is our opinion that the Dinaric is a much more important element. It is this trait which tends to distinguish them so much from the Jews who, whatever their racial trains, tend to have Armenoid as their common denominator. It should be pointed out *en passant* that what strikes one about the Jewish population of Palestine today, from a superficial examination of the population as one walks about the streets of places like Haifa and Tiberias, is that they are a people much lighter in complexion than the average Jews one sees in Europe and America. It could be, therefore, that a degree of selection is occurring in the establishment of the Israeli state. Eastern European Jews often have considerable East Baltic strains which would tend to add a light complexioned element, and these, we know, have formed a significant proportion of the settlers. In addition to this, perhaps the

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pioneering and settlement attractions of the new state have a stronger appeal to the more Nordic strains than to the more typical Armenoid-Mediterranean elements in the Jews. It should be observed that the very conditions of Israel call for farmers, engineers and skilled men capable of using their hands as well as their heads. The business man (merchant and banker) is less important in a new pioneering state—and yet the whole of Jewish genetic selection for 2000 years has been for this type. Thus the very type represented by the *average* Jew is less valuable for the development of the State of Israel than the types represented by many of the Christian nations. The result of this must be rigorous selection of those types in Jewry which are less typical of the Jews as a whole. We would, therefore, expect to find a tendency for the population of Israel to represent a type of Jew less typical than those we meet with elsewhere.

This selection has led to the agglomeration in Israel of an exceedingly energetic population. One result of this is the enormous progress to be seen on every side, in sharp contrast to the lethargy of neighbouring lands and nearly all of Africa. In any struggle with their neighbours this selection of the population of Israel must be a factor of considerable importance which would go a long way to offset the advantage of numbers of their Arab enemies. This suggestion is, of course, only a guess—but the tendency of Nordic nations to settle freely, and to become pioneers of new lands, is a well established fact, and such a predisposition is likely to have a genetic basis. Consequently there may well be a selective factor in favour of Nordic genes operating in this case. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that the Jewish population of Palestine does seem to have quite a high proportion (for Jews) of light complexions.

The Kurdish population in Northern Iraq has considerable Nordic blood, but in this case it is clearly mixed with Armenoid—indeed the Kurds provide some of the best type specimens of the Armenoid, with their very high dome-shaped heads. But in the Christian Arab population of Galilee, although this type is not absent, what impresses one is the Dinaric type as well as the Nordic. When the Armenoid does occur it is mixed with Dinaric. Nordo-Dinaric types have always shown markedly martial qualities, and if, as we suggest, these people are the descendants of the Indo-Europeans who swept as conquerors into Palestine in the second millennium B.C., then these facts are consistent with each other. The Druses, for instance, are particularly martial, which supports the same conclusion.

We have stressed that there is a difference between the average Christian Arab community and the Moslem Arabs, although the Christian Arabs have suffered equally with their Moslem co-linguists in the cataclysm which has overwhelmed Palestine. The Moslem

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Arabs appear to be more Mediterranean, which is not surprising since the Arabs were originally a branch of the Eastern Mediterranean race. Nevertheless, they have some Armenoid, Dinaric and even Nordic admixtures. The difference between the two communities is not only physical. The mental and psychological difference is seen in a place such as Nazareth. The Arab shopkeepers here are mainly Christian, although the majority of the Arab-speaking inhabitants of the town are Moslem. Again, of the Christian Arabs driven out of their country by the Jews, the vast majority have not rotted in the refugee camps. The Christian Arabs have scattered throughout the Arab world and become shopkeepers, tradesmen and professional men. Although refugees, they have pulled themselves upwards in the social scale by their own efforts. The Archbishop and his clergy suggest that these facts are due to their being Christians, and while there is little doubt that the fact of their Christianity must have some effect, it is possible that we are also dealing here with a genetic factor. For it is likely that the Nordo-Dinaric admixture in the Christian Arabs makes them more go-ahead than the average run of more Mediterrano-Armenoid Moslem Arabs, and so they have neither been content to waste their lives in disgruntled idleness as the recipients of charity in the camps in Jordan nor, in Palestine itself, are they content only to be an agricultural peasantry.

It might also be observed that the Christian Arab community does not tend to throw up the number of beggars such as one finds among the Moslems, and neither do their women, for instance, idly squat around the doorsteps and in the streets. Indeed, one would say that the Christian Arabs have a contempt for begging—a contempt which they even extend to their Christian brethren, the Latins. More than one remarked adversely to the writer that the Latins were "always after money." Of course this may not have been entirely fair as the Roman Catholics have large building and other projects on hand in places like Nazareth, for which large sums of money are needed. But the fact that such remarks were made indicates the attitude of mind of the Christian Arabs on this subject. It suggests that they are more self-reliant as compared with the Moslems and are not given to, and do not like, cadging in any way at all

In temperament there is quite a gulf between the Christian Arabs and the Jews—the former stress the importance of matters of honour rather than the expediency which is much more typical of a merchant community. For this reason the Christian Arabs say they prefer to deal with the Moslem Arab governments and rulers rather than with their new Jewish overlords. Of course, this view might well be influenced as much by the antipathies arising out of the war, and the grievances which the Christian Arabs harbour against the Jewish state, as by cultural conditioning combined with

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inherent racial tendencies of a genetic character. These suggestions are merely noted here for what they are worth.[4]

In the fact that they speak the same language as the Moslem Arabs both in Palestine and across the frontier in Jordan and Syria, the Christian Arabs feel a community of interest with the Arab world, and this is despite the fact that their religions are so different. Yet, as we have indicated, they are for all that genetically different in many respects from the rest of the Arab speaking peoples, and in a sense it is only an accident of history that they have become Arabs in speech, customs and dress. With the conquest of Palestine by Salah-ed-din,[5] the overthrow of the Christian Kingdom, and the expulsion of the dominating Western and Greek influences, the Christian population must have gradually lost its Western culture which has come to be replaced by that of the Arabs and the Moslem world. Perhaps in the example of the Arab liturgy of the Catholic Church in Palestine we have an instance of how this occurred—for the liturgy was originally Greek. These Christian Arab communities of Galilee are not the result, in the writer's opinion, of conversions from Islam, but are indigenous Christian communities of Palestine derived from the early Christian peoples of that country, racially descended from the ancient peoples of Galilee—from whom Christ drew eleven of his twelve disciples[6]—who in their turn were derived from the Indo-European conquerors of the early part of the second millennium B.C. Anyone who knows the signal failure of missions to Jews or Moslems must realise that there is little probability that these Christian Arabs are the descendants of converts from the Moslem Arab world—although there is no doubt that in so far as they think about the matter at all—since they tend to identify themselves with the Moslem Arabs—this is in fact the opinion, erroneous as we may think it is, which they entertain of themselves.

Returning to the point from which we started, anyone travelling to Palestine from Africa, or from India, is struck with the fact that in the whole of the population, Jewish, Moslem Arab or Christian Arab, one is dealing with completely Caucasoid or European

[4] It should be observed, again for what it is worth, that before the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine the majority of Christian Arabs had been favourable to Israel. But today, after their own sufferings, they say that this is no longer so consistently the case.

[5] Salah-ed-din and many of his followers had Kurdish and northern blood which accounted for their lighter colouring—but the overthrow of the "Franks" in Palestine led to the influx of Moslems the bulk of whom, the leaders apart, must have been largely Mediterranean in type.

[6] We are inclined to think that the enquiry "Are not these Galileans?" in reference to Christ's disciples was due not only to differences of dialect and dress from the Jews of Jerusalem but to the unmistakable Nordo-Dinaric racial traits to be found among the people of Galilee at that time —traits which marked them out as a distinct breed of men from the racially mixed, and much more Mediterrano-Armenoid, inhabitants of Judaea.

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peoples, and the only differences between them are found in the admixture of the various races of the Caucasoid stock which go to make up each community, which accounts not only for their common features but also for their differences. However, to think of these people, because they technically live in Asia, as Asiatics or Orientals of some kind is quite a mistaken appreciation of the ethnology of these lands, although it is the common view of most people—a view which, mistaken as it may be, forms the basis of much emotional thinking against the Caucasoids of Europe and America at the present time.

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THE NEW FANATICS

By WILLIAM A. MASSEY

Fanaticism and bigotry are dying in America at this time we are told. This simple statement does not strike one at first, but on consideration it gradually overwhelms one with its hilarious stupidity. It brings to mind those gibes and laments from the past where the tragi-comedy of man is exposed. Man, born to trouble, builds yet more snares to entrap himself. But those who laughed at man did not do so because they hated him, but because they understood and despaired. Now they say all this is past. We have moved to a new and higher plane where all our major follies are understood and can be eliminated.

Can one suspect this happy picture? Is it possible that we have not lost our stupidity but rather the subtlety to comprehend it? Have we lost the fanaticism of religion, nationalism, racism, only to replace it with the fanaticism of brotherhood? Perhaps we have lost none and gained none. For what we have now is an amalgam of the old, more powerful, more self righteous and more fanatical than all the rest.

Who are the new fanatics? They are the intellectuals: those people whose interests extend beyond the people and problems in their own area. They are writers, commentators, reporters, clergymen, teachers, social scientists, and many other executive and professional groups. Modern communication and transportation have given this group a unity that never existed before. Indeed the intellectuals now display signs of being a distinct social group with their own beliefs and goals.

This is not a group of people who arrived at the same beliefs independently of one another and then banded together. Instead the group indoctrinates its members much as a child is acquainted with the mores of his society. In certain areas only one point of view is presented. Not because those doing the presenting are trying to deceive anyone, but because they feel there is only one correct point of view. Not only is one point of view presented but it is generally made obvious that to believe otherwise is not quite the thing to do. This type of indoctrination is almost impossible to resist. It is assimilated so easily and naturally that one can hardly question the resulting beliefs.

It seems that such a program must also require a conspiracy, but this is not so. Instead, the position that members of this group occupy in our society makes their activities quite feasible. In the evolution of our society they have been entrusted with the

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education of our children and with control of most of our sources of information. When they were given the positions they now hold there was no thought of the present development. In the past it is true that the intellectuals may have constituted a distinct class, but they were not so numerous nor did they possess the group consciousness they now have.

Not that there is a well defined organization among this group. It is this that is incomprehensible to many people who oppose this group. It seems impossible that the intellectuals can effectively press for their goals without a tight organization. However, to charge this group with conspiracy is to attribute to most of the members an awareness of purpose and group identity which they lack. Actually many members of this group have never seriously considered their place in the group or the group's activities. They may concede that they are better educated, better read and more tolerant than most people in the country, but that is all.

Not all intellectuals are active participants in the current fanaticism, and a few even object to the group's activities. Not many object though, because the group sets the policies for the actions of its members in a very real sense. Many of them will object that this is not so, and will say that the unanimity of their beliefs arises from the soundness of these beliefs. This is a naive point of view. Their unanimity is very similar to the unanimity which every social group shows in respect to certain beliefs. One has only to see a professor in a southern college rather timidly oppose the current mania for racial equality to realize just how subject to group pressure an intellectual is. The professor's timidity is particularly amazing when he teaches in a college supported by a state whose people and legislature obviously support segregation.

It is even more surprising to consider that most of the intelligent and curious students considered him a bigot immediately. These students were well on their way to being indoctrinated with the current intellectual views. In school they hear almost nothing to suggest that any other views exist. What they read rarely suggests that there is any doubt about the current intellecual thinking. As a result they come to accept these views as natural and proper.

To compound the fanaticism that results from their indoctrination, the intellectuals add ethical justification. Justification is too weak a word. Rather, ethical motivation is an integral part of their fanaticism, as it is in all fanaticism. It lends an almost religious overtone to their crusade. Indeed many clergymen declare that the intellectual crusade in the field of civil rights is imperative on religious grounds.

In searching for a parallel to this crusade of the American intellectuals it is interesting to compare it with that of intellectuals

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in other countries. The most striking comparison is between the intellectuals, the socialists, and the communists. These last two movements and the current intellectual drive have similar origins. All seem related to the emergence of the intellectuals as an influential group. All these movements were intended, at least originally, to mould society into the form the intellectuals considered ideal. As such it is almost a class struggle in the Marxist sense, with the intellectuals contending with the old leaders for power. In America the struggle has never been very bitter or well defined. The intellectuals have never evolved the rigid theories or the tight organization of the communists. They never had to. As they became aware of their identity as a group they achieved a degree of recognition and power. As a result there was never the deep and bitter gulf between the intellectuals and the ruling classes that sometimes existed in parts of Europe. In spite of the lack of sharp class divisions, the American intellectuals have evolved their own set of goals which they desire and intend to reach.

The intellectuals do not feel that they are imposing their will on the country because they believe their aim is the perfection of the country's institutions and traditions. They are wrong. Some of their views evolved from those of one part of the country, but most are their own. Some will object that there is nothing novel in the new ideas and unusual influence of the intellectuals. This is true. What is novel now is the relative independence of the intellectuals from restrictions by other groups. As their number has increased they have become less dependent on other groups and more dependent on one another. The result is the emergence of their unique group beliefs.

It is the failure of the people of America to see the intellectuals as a distinct political force with their own goals that enhances the intellectuals' influence. The intellectuals can expound their views as though they speak for everyone and there is little the opposition can do about it. To be read or to be heard one must have the approval of the intellectuals, except in the rare cases where one is exhibited as an oddity to show the intellectuals' tolerance.

What are the goals of the intellectuals? First and foremost they want integration of the races. This they want on ethical and what they consider practical grounds. This is one area where they will not tolerate opposition. Any attempt to argue with them is brushed aside as irrelevant. In this they are seriously remiss. It is not obvious that integration is desirable or feasible on any large scale. This is obvious from the contradictions in sociological literature and from experience in this area. However, almost every intellectual is certain that his beliefs about race relations are supported by absolute proof. No matter if their measures fail, they can always explain. No matter how involved or artificial the explanation they never question their own beliefs.

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In economics they tend toward socialism because it is the logical extrapolation of the intellectuals' desires in the economic sphere. Many intellectuals do not consider themselves socialists because they have not thought through their belief to the point where the similarity to socialism is obvious. Others realize the similarity but do not like to be called socialists because of its unfavorable connotation. Nonetheless, both the intellectuals and the socialists feel that business and industry should be directed by the state to serve the common good. They do not have in mind the regulation or prohibition of specific activities but rather they want to use business as a tool of government. Business would be used to provide better jobs, better living conditions, and the like.

In such a state the businessmen have no legitimate self-interests because no group has any legitimate self-interests. Instead the state defines the public interests and it is the duty of the citizens to follow the state in advancing these interests. If this meant that a national policy was promulgated when there was an obvious and serious conflict between public and private interests there would be nothing novel in this idea. But, to the intellectuals, any conflict between the public and private interests is serious because it represents wasted effort. In their philosophy the conflict is the result of confused thinking on the part of the private interests, or else results from an intolerable desire to profit at the public expense. As a result any area is the legitimate subject of government intervention. This willingness of the intellectuals to make the government omnipotent arises from their conviction that a properly constituted government is omiscient and just. In addition, such a government is necessary if the greatest good is to be secured for the greatest number of people.

Because of these beliefs the intellectuals pose two dangers to the United States. One is that they will weaken its society and economy through unwise measures. The second danger is that they will make the government a socialist dictatorship. It should not be thought that the intellectuals are particularly wise in practical matters. In these areas their judgement is notoriously poor. Consider how the intellectuals who nourished Communism became its slaves in the end. The intellectuals have no real comprehension of or desire for the traditional American democracy. What they want is their concept of an ideal democracy. This latter is an unproved, untried thing. They believe it will be vastly superior to what we now have in America but there is no proof of this. It is quite possible that, if they centralize control in Washington as they so ardently desire, they and everyone else will be subject to a new and far less democratic government. If this happened they would wail that they were betrayed as they were in Russia, as they were in Cuba. It never occurs to them that what they want may be inherently impossible.

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Throughout all the arguments of the intellectuals runs a strong thread of fanaticism. No matter how often they fail they must try again. To concede defeat or to admit to error in some of their beliefs is impossible. Such an admission would cast doubt on their whole system of beliefs and deprive them of their most precious possession, absolute certainty in their beliefs. They insist that their desire for what they propose is rational, but it is not. It is emotional. This is their greatest stupidity. To want something is natural. To want something so much that one is willing to do anything for it is not uncommon either. But it is this latter that has led to catastrophe time and time again. Yet the intellectuals assure us this type of fanaticism is dead, even as they show every sign of being precisely this type of fanatic.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION: FAD OR NECESSITY?

At no time since the Civil War has there been as much agitation about the discrimination against the Negro as there is in America at present. This fight to reduce discrimination and bigotry is waged on all fronts. All the news media, the government, churches and schools hammer away at this flaw in American national character. What does all this agitation mean and how did it come about?

Certainly it is not the result of any moral awakening among the majority of the American people. It is to these people that the campaign is addressed. Those responsible for the campaign probably consider themselves the intellectual élite. They appear convinced that all races are equal and all are entitled to the greatest possible happiness and freedom. Further, they feel that not all citizens receive their due and this, to these intellectuals, seems an intolerable flaw in our society which they must correct at all costs.

This intellectual élite has not always had this goal, so one may wonder what brings it to their attention at this time. Perhaps it is another manifestation of the growth of social consciousness, for lack of a better word, that began around the turn of the century. This social consciousness has brought forth many movements, all of which hold that it is the function of the national government, not simply to preserve the status quo, but actively to advance the welfare of its citizens, particularly the lower classes. The most extreme movements, communism and socialism, and to a lesser extent the current drive of the intellectuals, argue that the condition of the lowest classes is due to abuses of governmental or economic power. In the United States and other countries this attitude has resulted in labor and welfare legislation. In still other countries the more extreme movements have triumphed.

Almost a corollary of these groups' beliefs about the proper function of a government is a lack of faith in the ability of individual men to govern their own affairs under current con-

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ditions. There is an almost inevitable implication that an élite group must direct the government until it reaches some higher plane, at which point control will be handed to the people themselves. Unfortunately this last phase appears to be long in coming. Perhaps this is because the vision of a government directing its citizens to glorious goals is so inspiring that one does not willingly give it up, particularly if one is, or expects to be, a party to the directing.

In addition to the growth of social consciousness, another major factor in the present civil rights agitation was the Second World War. This war engendered a tremendous amount of sympathy for the Jews, and discredited claims of racial superiority and thus racial differences. As a result of the German excesses most intellectuals and many other people took a stand at the other extreme on the question of anti-semitism and the existence of racial differences.

Because of this, when these intellectuals turned their attention to our problems in race relations, they adopted as their goal the elimination of all segregation and discrimination. To them there is no doubt. All men are equal. All men are entitled to equal treatment in every respect. There is no alternative, no valid reason for delay. Anyone who opposes this may be tolerated but he is so obviously out of step with reality that nothing he says matters.

How do these people intend to end bigotry and discrimination? Primarily they intend to mould public opinion. In addition they are also pressing for legislation and other governmental action to implement their aims. The primary method is the moulding of public opinion since public support is vital in securing government action and in implementing their program. They are in a good position to accomplish their aim since they have an influence out of all proportion to their number. They are writers, teachers, and the like. As such they have the influence necessary to make a start toward their goal. Further, they have no compunction about using their position for propaganda. This willingness to slant the news is in strange contrast to their frequent statement that a free press is necessary for an informed public. They can justify their action since they are merely insuring that the citizenry draws the right conclusions. In the schools they similarly assist their students toward the right beliefs.

Why are these people so devoted to this cause that they will act in this manner? The answer varies depending on the individual. In the case of the Negroes, and to a lesser extent the Jews, the interest in this cause can be for selfish reasons. These people stand to gain if the current campaign succeeds. The Negro in America is obviously discriminated against socially, economically and legally. The Jews, while not discriminated against to the same extent, still doubt that their neighbors accept them fully. As a

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result both groups feel they cannot help but gain from the current drive.

This may explain the actions of these groups, but what of all the other proponents of civil rights measures? Surely not all intellectuals are unanimous in their beliefs, but one never hears a respectable intellectual dissent from the current exhortations for tolerance. Why is this? It is because the proponents of civil rights action have established an atmosphere in which opposition to their cause automatically brands one as a bigot, a person who could not rise above his prejudices. This pressure to conform is a tribute to the herd instinct of the intellectuals. In spite of the fact that they consider themselves above the common herd by virtue of their independent thinking, the truth is that they simply belong to a different herd and are as uncritical in their thinking as those they look down on. The sight of an intellectual taking a stand contrary to that of those around him is not always a sign of a courageous thinker. More often it merely means that the people who really matter to him are his fellow intellectuals. The favorable opinion of his fellow intellectuals is vital since he depends on them for a livelihood and companionship. If he has to choose between the beliefs of the people around him and those of the intellectuals it is easier to side with the intellectuals.

Accompanying this trend toward conformity among the intellectuals is the surprising susceptibility of this group to fads such as the present civil rights crusade. This would be of only academic interest if these people did not try to implement their fads with varying results. One result is probably the contempt in which most people hold intellectuals.

Regardless of the background of the situation, the important question is whether or not the arguments advanced in favor of civil rights action are correct. Some of the more common arguments are:

1. If we are to abide by the spirit in which the United States was founded, these groups must have equality.
2. The Constitution says all men are equal.
3. World opinion demands equality for these groups.
4. Science has shown that all races are equal.
5. The country must utilize all its citizens' abilities to the fullest extent, and this requires equality for all citizens.

Consider the first reason given. Was the United States founded in the spirit that all races were equal? It would appear not. Some of the founders probably did believe that all races were equal and hoped that this view would prevail. Many, if not most of them, did not so believe and would not have been a party to a government founded on such an asinine, to their thinking, assumption.

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Thus it is not possible to advocate equality for all races on the grounds that it was part of the original agreement setting up the government. It may be argued that the Civil War settled the question. It did in a practical sense. However, the Civil War was at least partially the result of differing interpretations of the Constitution, and it is not possible simply to assume that the right interpretation won, unless victory and right are synonymous.

The same considerations mean there is no justification in the present literal belief in the Constitution's statement that all men are equal.

The argument that science has shown that all races are equal is not satisfactory. The scientists who claim they have proved that all races are equal are suspect because of their obvious desire that all races should be equal. This may seem strange but it can be verified by a study of the literature in sociology and related fields.

Such a study discloses that the first theories concerning race generally attributed the success of various nations to the superiority of their inhabitants' race. Race in these theories often meant a national group rather than a group with common hereditary traits. These theories were later discarded as untenable. There followed a variety of theories about race and racial differences. At a time some years prior to the Second World War the most prevalent opinion was that previous theories that pure races existed, particularly races having different origins, were erroneous. Instead a race was a group with distinguishable hereditary characteristics. Physical characteristics were most commonly considered since they were easily measured. The question of mental differences did come up. As a result of various tests it appeared that the races could be ranked in intelligence as follows:

White (British or American) Yellow (Chinese or Japanese)	Equal
American Indian	
American Negro	

The tests obviously did not include all races. Such tests could not really be considered conclusive but more as an indication of probable differences. The logical subsequent step would appear to be to refine the techniques and extend the tests to include other races. At this time the Second World War occurred. During this war an interesting phenomenon occurred among the sociologists and the psychologists. There was almost a complete halt in the investigation of racial differences. It seems possible that this was a retreat from any position that could be identified with the Nazi theories of race supremacy. During the war and for some time thereafter there was little serious work on the question of racial differences. When interests in the field revived some time later the

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prevalent theories contrasted sharply with those prior to the war. The surprising thing is that this change cannot be traced to any major new discovery or new work in the transition period. It seems that the change was more an emotional rather than a rational one.

One thing did occur prior to and during this change. Gunnar Myrdal of Sweden, with a grant from the Carnegie Foundation, made an extensive study of the Negro problem in the United States. The book in which he presents his results, entitled *An American Dilemma,* is an interesting one. It is, or was until recently, considered the last word on the Negro problem in America. It not only contains a large amount of data on the American Negro, but it also heralds two shifts in the attitudes of sociologists. For one thing, Myrdal indicates that sociologists should not merely study society but should try to change it for the better. Unfortunately he does not make it clear how one knows what is better. For another thing he feels that the one respect in which the country urgently needs changing is the Negro problem. He does not give any real reason for this feeling except to comment that what he calls the "American dream" or "American ideal" makes such action necessary.

The chapters of his book which deal with the question of racial differences contain some interesting reading. After considerable discussion of the results of tests that were supposed to show the presence or lack of racial differences, he concludes that it is safe to advocate equality for the Negro since there is no conclusive proof of racial differences. Not because there is proof of racial equality. This seems an important distinction since the first statement requires only that previous work be discredited. Since the earlier work was crude it is quite easy to point out possible discrepancies in it. To be able to say that the races are equal is not so easy. Apparently the data did not exist and probably does not exist now to support such a conclusion.

In reading this book it is surprising to find a scientist who so obviously lets his personal convictions color his work. This is not to belittle such convictions, but most scientists make an effort to prevent their convictions from coloring their work. In fairness to Myrdal it should be pointed out that this has been a problem in sociology and the related fields since their inception.

Since Myrdal states that the most recent tests have cast doubt on the theory that racial differences do exist, it would be interesting to compare the old and new tests. The old tests are covered in a number of books but it is difficult to locate information on the new tests. This could be due to the delays inherent in the publication of a book, except that many books have been published since Myrdal's book. Some of these make reference to Myrdal's book but few, if any, examine the basis for Myrdal's conclusions, even

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when they base their work on his conclusions. It is difficult to locate reports supporting Myrdal's position even in the sociological periodicals. It seems incredible that the scientific work which caused a reversal of opinion in sociology should be so poorly documented.

To summarize this discussion of the scientific proof of racial equality, one might say that there is no proof of this theory. The scientists who have propounded this theory have often shown more "bias for" than "proof of" the theory. In any event, a social scientist who subscribes to the theory that he should mould society into a more ideal state is not a scientist. He is an agitator masquerading as a scientist.

Another argument advanced in favor of civil rights action is that we must utilize the full talents of all our people. This is a dubious proposition at best. First, it is unlikely that we will ever utilize more than a small fraction of the ability of any of our people, regardless of to which group they belong. The world simply has not reached that state yet. In the second place, it is obvious that the Negro in the United States is an inferior group in both the North and the South. It is claimed that this is due primarily to environment but there is no scientific evidence to support this view. It is true that the Negro's environment probably has an unfavorable effect on him regardless of his native ability. But his inability to rise above his present level is probably because he lacks the ability to compete successfully for any other position, not because he found himself in this position and has not been able to get out. This inferior status of the Negro has almost been formalized in areas which have had a substantial Negro population for some time. This generally results in a stable, workable relationship between the races. It does work a hardship on the exceptional Negro, which is regrettable. On the other hand, those northern cities which have recently been subject to the influx of a large number of Negroes have tremendous problems because they persist in trying to do precisely what the civil rights agitators have as their goal. They try to treat the Negro as a white citizen and fail. They fail because the people whom the Negroes replaced required far less from the city because they were able to run their own affairs with reasonable success. The city was, in fact, the creation of its old citizens. The Negroes on the other hand require a tremendous increase in the city's services to maintain reasonable order and living standards. They are actually wards of the city. Unfortunately the city is least able to expand its services at this point because its income from these new citizens is lower than that from its former inhabitants. By this time the city is incapable of taking any other course. The Negroes have the right to vote, and vote to get what they want. At this point it appears that the Whites in many cities realize they have lost. Even though the city

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officials make an attempt to maintain some kind of balance of power between the races, the balance changes. It is strange to see the Whites who were so confident that the Negroes would make satisfactory citizens move when their neighborhood changes. But move they do and the city is left with its problem.

From what has happened it is obvious that insuring that the Negro exercises all his rights is far from beneficial. Instead it poses problems for which there are no proven solutions. Instead of resulting in the integration and equalization of the races it results in the disruption of the normal social order. When the situation stabilizes all that is different is the location of the groups. The more radical civil rights advocates maintain that the races should be forced to remain in contact until they grow accustomed to one another. It is not likely that many Whites are willing to give anyone the power to commit them to a situation from which they cannot escape merely because someone says it is for the common good. The only exceptions are those areas where the race problem is trivial.

The argument that it is desirable to extend equality to all groups in America to impress the colored people of the world has some merit. If we are going to depend on their good will such a propaganda gesture would be desirable. However, the desire for their friendship is based to a large extent on the belief that these countries possess a great potential for the future. This rests on much the same basis as the feeling that the American Negro is suddenly going to come into his own. This is contrary to all past and present evidence. Neither the American Negro nor the underdeveloped nations of the world are likely suddenly to make any substantial contribution to civilisation. There is nothing magic about the good will of these countries. The United States and most other countries would survive quite well if they did not exist. Yet the fog of sentimentality generated by those who believe in the brotherhood of man and nations has so befuddled America and Western Europe that we are ashamed of their superiority. And we obviously are superior, for it is the other nations that envy us and not vice versa. Why should we apologize for succeeding where they failed? In most cases the physical environments of our ancestors were not so drastically different, so the different degree of success is more likely due to racial or cultural differences. This backwardness of certain races would seem to argue that they are not our equal. Treating them as such is, if not stupid, at least ludicrous.

If we decide an area is essential to our survival, would it not be better to assume control of it rather than to tell both ourselves and its inhabitants that they are our equal and then try to buy their friendship? People may protest that old colonialism is dead, but it is not. Western Europe and the United States have simply

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become too humane to make it work. Russia, unbothered by such scruples, has demonstrated that one can subdue any country and make it a colony. Even a civilized and freedom loving group can be handled in this manner, and this should be harder than controlling some of the so-called "uncommitted nations."

All the arguments above do not disprove the theories of the civil rights advocates, they merely show them to be theory and not fact. In one respect at least the agitators for civil rights may be correct. They say the issues they raise are vital. They are probably right. They are advocating major changes in the country's structure which could have disastrous results, yet they have no facts to support their arguments for these actions. Under these conditions their advice may be not so much vital as fatal.

The uncomfortable fact is that the Negro may never make a good American citizen. Even if he is of adequate intelligence he may be temperamentally unsuited for citizenship in a democracy. It is possible that democracy is not the natural state of mankind, in spite of our fond belief to the contrary. If history shows anything, it is a form of government restricted to a few places and few races. Perhaps a democracy offers advantages which appear desirable only to certain groups. Only those people who appreciate these advantages have any real reason to try and make a democracy work. There is no reason to believe that anyone made a citizen will automatically appreciate the advantages of a democracy, much less work to retain them. This point obviously was and is recognized in our immigration laws. These discriminate, not always justly perhaps, against those races which are not felt suited for citizenship in the United States. This acknowledges that some races fit more easily into our society and adapt themselves to it more rapidly. This contradicts the fatuous belief that diversity of people is an essential in a democracy. Groups such as the Negro can be assimilated successfully only if they conform to the standards of citizenship. They must not be given a major voice in government until they do conform. This may seem a selfish point of view but it seems realistic. The United States was not founded as a haven for diverse cultural groups. It had and has a fairly distinct culture. The preservation of this culture is the responsibility of its citizens. They have not only the right but the responsibility to restrict participation in the government to those whom they consider fit. No one has the right, simply because he exists, to participate in the government. This seems to imply a contradiction since this is supposed to be a democracy. How can one justify denying anyone the right to have a part in governing his own country? The answer is, at least partially, that our form of government is an artificial structure. To continue to operate its citizens must be competent and the areas of disagreement between groups of citizens must not be so great that they cannot be settled

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in an orderly fashion. Its strength lies not in its Constitution but in its people and their traditions. Written constitutions mean nothing, as can be verified by comparing the number of countries with democratic constitutions with the number of democracies. Our Constitution is admirable so long as it represents an agreement between free men under which they govern themselves. If it evolves in some strange way with time, taking on new meanings in each age without being rewritten or amended, it is not the constitution of a democracy. It is a religious relic. If the Constitution is warped by men to fit their own prejudices, no matter how admirable these prejudices may seem, or if men fail to govern themselves peacefully under it, then neither the Constitution nor the men display any particular virtue.

The intellectuals take another view of the Constitution. To them it points the way to Utopia; at least their interpretation of it does. This brings up an important point. The intellectuals do not act as they do because of the way they interpret the Constitution. Instead, the philosophy that impels them requires that they interpret the Constitution as they do. Their aim is not the strengthening of constitutional government but rather the brotherhood of men and nations. Parts of the Constitution fit their plans perfectly so they emphasize those parts. It does not occur to them that they may violate the original intent of the Constitution, nor does it matter that the measures they propose may actually reduce the freedom of men. In their view, the goal which they seek transcends such things. True, they may hurt people, destroy their traditions, but this is only a transient thing. The result of their measures will be a world where men will enjoy the material things of life more equally, where all men will be brothers, and where a truer democracy will prevail.

The similarity of these aims to those of the communists is striking, as is the similarity of the methods by which they intend to reach them. Both groups want to bring about the brotherhood and equality of man, in theory at least. Both groups propose that the national government should be the instrument for accomplishing this. The communists openly concede that the transition must be directed by an élite group. The intellectuals of the United States are not so open. Instead they hope to direct the country's evolution toward their goal. To this end they must strengthen the federal government's control over the people. It must be able to decide what is good for the people and then shape their thinking so that the decision may be implemented. To this end federal control, rather than local control, must be made to appear the logical answer to every major question. It may be argued that both the federal and the local governments are ultimately responsible to the people, and such a transfer of power is harmless. This is not so. One reason that the powers not delegated to the federal

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government in the Constitution were reserved to the states was the tendency of a strong central government to force its citizens into conformity beyond all reasonable need, the degree and areas of conformity being dictated more by the whim of those in power than by any danger to national security or to the common good.

If it seems impossible that more federal control is on the way, remember this is the goal of many people who control or influence sources of news and information. In a sense they are willingly playing the part of the government controlled news media in order to strengthen the government so it can do what they desire. This is not so strange as it may seem since their aims and those of the government are similar, if for no other reason than because of the influence they exert on the government. These people can influence Congress to some extent, either directly or through the voters, but it is the executive branch that is most susceptible. Members of the executive branch are often intellectuals or at least have intellectual pretensions. As such they are influenced by the current intellectual fad. The office of the President is particularly susceptible if the President shares the current intellectual prejudices. The President not only has wide discretionary powers but he can also exert considerable pressure on Congress. At one time the Supreme Court could have nullified the effectiveness of excessive pressure by extremists, but this has changed in recent years. The Supreme Court gained substantial power and independence within the government because of circumstances and the unusual ability of some Justices, but there is no constitutional justification for this. Once President Roosevelt succeeded in putting his men on the Court to get his way the Court became in many ways simply an extension of the executive branch. The prejudices of the executive branch seem in time to be shared by the Supreme Court, where they manifest themselves in the Court's decisions. Thus, far from moderating the influence of the intellectual's prejudices on the executive branch, the Supreme Court may actually extend the range of this influence.

It is interesting to note what areas the intellectuals want to put under federal control. Generally these are not areas where there is common agreement that the local governments have failed. Instead they are areas where the intellectuals have an interest but where they have not been able to gain control on the local level. Not having been successful with the local governments the intellectuals want to shift control to the federal government where they feel stronger. They overlook the fact that their inability arbitrarily to do as they want is not a complete loss. It insures that, if and when they are not very powerful, they will not be subject to equally arbitrary action. They forget that, should they succeed in being able to do what they want when they want, they will have to retain control forever lest their successor use this power against them.

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The impatience of the intellectuals with the constitutional and traditional safeguards which hinder them at the moment shows a basic lack of understanding. They really do not believe that the cumbersome machinery of democracy is necessary, because they do not believe that honorable and reasonable men can disagree. Certain in their beliefs and safe in their good intentions, they cannot account for the opposition to their plans. Their opponents must be ignorant, prejudiced, or simply selfish. Having thus no respect or tolerance for the opposition the important thing is to win, not to play the game.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the situation does have its amusing aspects. One of the oddest is the charge of "bigot" which is so often hurled by the civil rights advocate. If a bigot is one who shows an irrational attachment to unsound beliefs, it seems likely that the civil rights advocates are in a poor position to cry "bigot." Very few of them reached their present convictions by pure reason. Talk to any of them long enough and it becomes obvious that the reasons they give are merely window dressing. Their views ultimately rest on ethical, religious, or similar grounds. This, in itself, is not a fault, because most men's convictions are similarly based. What can be objected to in the civil rights advocates is their fanaticism, their absolute conviction of the soundness of their beliefs.

Amusing? Not really, more tragic. For, if the civil rights advocates really want to solve the race problem, they are betrayed by their own good will. They cannot bear to look at the problem, and so can never really come to grips with it.

WHITHER BROTHERHOOD?

Nowhere. The brotherhood of man is no more to be achieved in this age than in the past. The current furore over brotherhood is compounded of fallacy and foolishness. For it is fallacy to believe that men are no longer separated by enduring differences, and it is foolishness wilfully to believe this fallacy. Yet this fallacy is the basis for the present campaign for brotherhood. This is not a campaign by men who love humanity, but by men obsessed with a vision. Their vision is of a united mankind marching toward a Utopian world. It is the stylized, inhuman vision they love, not man. They do not look at man dispassionately, or even with affection, to see his condition and help him. Instead they preach a mystic brotherhood of man that is both goal and means to the goal. This brotherhood is not reached by good will, understanding and tolerance. It is a fanatic's dream, a will-o'-the-wisp that gives them the self-righteousness to vent their hatreds with a clear conscience. Better an honest enemy than so strange a brother.

Is it not strange that these advocates of brotherhood should

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have such obvious favorites as the Negro and all the ragtag nations who must be given a dole lest we be deprived of their brotherly abuse? If their brotherhood was compounded of mutual respect and understanding then Western Europe would seem far more logical a favorite. Actually this brotherhood represents an inversion of values. Disenchanted with the current world and those who made it, these advocates of brotherhood exalt all the motley mob who have been the victims of the world's injustice. They do not stop to think that being unfortunate is not always a sign of character. More often than not it is a sign of stupidity or general incompetence.

There is something approaching the "noble savage" in this thinking. It is an attempt to find new heroes in which to believe. Above all it is a refusal to accept the world as a place where the idealist is betrayed by others and by himself. How much easier it is to see the world as an artificial construction of misguided men than to view its present imperfect state as representing the best efforts of well intentioned men. For, if the world as it stands is the work of honorable and competent men, one must renounce the vision of Utopia in the realization that men today are little better.

Is it not a happier mythology to believe oneself and one's fellows a new breed, no longer bound by the old traditions and old fallacies? How promising is the bright new world to be constructed with the help of the oppressed groups and the emerging nations. The persecuted Jew, the long suffering Negro, and all the underdeveloped nations are on the move to a new and better world—a world which we must join, lest we linger only as a relic of the archaic past. How quaint and simple a tale this is, better suited for children than men.

Still, the advocates of brotherhood insist on their Utopia. If they are to have a Utopia they must have Utopians. Those groups that have exercised some control over their own destiny and have not chosen Utopia cannot be Utopians. If there are any Utopians they must be those who have fallen prey to the evil of the world and are held in subjugation, ergo the Negroes, and the colonies of the imperialists. In this mythology these people fail to display their innate goodness only because of the artificial conditions imposed on them. If these restrictions are removed, these people will rapidly take their place in the world. There is no need to train or indoctrinate them to make them good citizens of the world.

Good world citizenship is innate in these groups. Indeed, it is this that characterizes the current advocates of brotherhood. They believe that there is a universal and irresistible drive toward brotherhood innate in mankind. If they can but lift the artificial barriers that restrict this drive, a new and ultimate society will evolve.

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For this reason all groups must be considered capable of and ready for self-government. To believe otherwise is to acknowledge that this drive toward brotherhood is weak or non-existent. Such an admission could mean that there are neither Utopians nor Utopia. This the advocates of brotherhood simply refuse to admit. It would compromise their glorious vision and force them into the tawdry world of reality. To save the vision they must deny or explain away all the undesirable actions of these groups that they hope are moving toward a Utopian society. These anti-social actions must be the result of the groups' unnatural environments. If the actions of these groups are due to some innate mental peculiarity or are simply illogical, then the Utopia is neither safe nor sure.

In the same way, any group that has favorable circumstances but which does not believe in universal brotherhood poses a real problem. The failure of such a group to move toward brotherhood contradicts the theory of universal brotherhood and is a danger to the vision. Inherited group insanity cannot be considered because this is ruled out by the theory of universal brotherhood. The only explanation is that these people have been so influenced by an extreme environment that they oppose their natural inclination toward brotherhood. In a sense these people are insane, but only because of their peculiar environment. As such, they pose a temporary but not a basic problem in the evolution of a society based on brotherhood.

The current brotherhood movement is a dangerous one. It is a fanatical, naïvely puritannical, quasi-religious movement. Because it requires its members to interpret reality to fit an abstract, rigid theory, it introduces a strong element of irrationality into their behavior. In the United States this movement influences both domestic and foreign policies. Internally it has led to a campaign to convince people that there are no such things as basic differences between groups. The campaign decries anti-semitism, prejudice against the Negro, and the like. These things are called undemocratic, un-American, stupid, and so on. This is not correct. It is true that some of the prejudices may be exaggerated. This does not make them untrue or undesirable. Actually, common prejudices would appear to be a part of any contact between unlike groups. They are a thumbnail sketch of a group's salient social features. As such they are a general guide in dealing with that group. To eliminate prejudice one must eliminate the differences which give rise to the prejudice. If the current brotherhood campaign recognized this it would stand a far greater chance of success.

It is unfortunate that the present campaign is carried out with such fanatical fervor. Many of the things being done are unwise and useless. These things dissipate the energy and good will that might have been used to make concrete progress. In addition, the

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excesses of the present campaign may ultimately result in a reaction that could leave matters worse than before.

ARE ALL RACES EQUAL?

The relative capabilities of the various races is a subject of the utmost importance today. Despite a lack of knowledge in this area, the domestic and foreign policies of the United States are based on the assumption that all races are equal. If this assumption is not correct, it is likely that many of our actions will not have the intended result. In domestic policy the primary concern is the equality of the Negro, but the current concern with this one group should not obscure the larger question involving all races. This larger question has a bearing on the practical and ethical problems which America and other countries face now and in the future. Unfortunately, reliable information on racial differences is almost totally lacking.

There will be immediate protests that the social sciences have shown that all races are equal. This simply is not so. A study of the books and periodicals in sociology and psychology will disclose that there is no valid data on the relative abilities of the various races. Work in these areas appears to have shown that there is an overlap in the abilities of the members of different races. That is, the smartest members of any race are smarter than the bulk of the members of any other race. This is not an answer to the question however. The question is how does one race rank against another race in ability? Are there are differences and are these differences significant in accounting for the different levels of attainment of various races? Must these differences be taken into account if one wishes to help a group? These questions have never been answered satisfactorily.

One reason for the lack of an answer is the difficulty in measuring the innate ability of a group. Many of the tests used have been shown to be more indicative of a person's background than of his native ability. This fault in the tests rendered much of the early work on racial differences of doubtful significance. There were peculiarities in the results that one could use to argue that they were not valid. For instance, the Chinese tested did as well as the whites in spite of their cultural dissimilarity. The Negroes and the American Indians did more poorly. However, the fact that a group's background may have influenced the results of these tests makes the findings of doubtful value. The latest tests are equally doubtful for other reasons. These last tests have sometimes been given to subjects of different races who had essentially the same background or status. There is no indication that this can be considered a representative sampling of the races. It is quite possible that choosing a Negro who has the same status as a white

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man for such a test would result in the choice of a Negro who was actually superior to the white man. Considering the greater difficulty the Negro faces in reaching the same position because of the unfortunate reputation his race enjoys, it seems likely that the Negro would be at least as good, if not better.

In an attempt to avoid these problems, tests have been devised whose results are not supposed to depend on the background of the person being tested. The problem here is that unless one has several races of different backgrounds and known abilities it is difficult to tell if the tests work as desired. This obviously requires that one already has solved the problem.

Difficult as these problems are, they probably would not be insurmountable except for the current bias of the sociologists. They have been infected with the current intellectual fad which assumes that all races are equal. As a result, much of their work seems aimed at vindicating this point of view. Indeed, the combination of bias, sloppy experimentation, and dubious statistical analysis has made sociology pretty much a waste of time.

In view of the failure of the social sciences to yield an answer to the question of whether or not racial differences exist, one is inclined to fall back on one's own observations. While this is better than arbitrarily picking a belief, it is not a satisfactory means of settling so difficult a question. It would be better if an answer could be found scientifically. Actually, it is likely that this question will ultimately be answered scientifically. Even if the social sciences continue to hide their heads in the sand, some of the related physical sciences will probably clear up this point.

Unfortunately, an answer is needed now. There are decisions which must be made immediately. Without valid information these decisions must be based on guesses or mere prejudice. If the decisions made now are wrong the responsibility will rest in no small measure on the social sciences. Not only have they dubious information to give, but they give it with assurances of its validity.

Strangely enough, the current importance of knowing whether or not racial differences exist rests on the motive underlying many of America's actions. This motive is an abstract desire to advance the well-being of mankind. This may require that certain things be done which are not in our best interest but which will yield some long term benefit. Many things fall in this category. Integration of the races in America, foreign aid, and the encouragement of former colonies to seek their independence fall in this category. All of these things are the result of a desire to do what is right and, more importantly, of a particular assumption about the nature of mankind. The assumption is that all races are equal. This assumption has a corollary since, if all races are equal, then all differences in culture are due to environment alone. If environment alone determines cultural characteristics, then all races can

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be made equal in practice and something approaching universal brotherhood can be achieved if the proper environment can be created.

Since we are expending men, time and money on the assumption that all races are equal, the validity of this assumption should be the subject of careful analysis. As already mentioned there is negligible evidence to support this theory. In addition there is almost no discussion of this point in the United States. This would seem to be due to the predisposition of many people to believe that all races are inherently equal. Although most Americans never carried this belief to its current extreme, this national inclination has been augmented by the propaganda of the intellectuals, with whom the equality of all men has become an article of faith. Probably the greatest triumph of the intellectuals was to capture the minds of the social scientists. Once these men subscribed to the beliefs of the intellectuals it was not long until the intellectuals' propaganda was supported by statements that their position was based on scientific fact.

There are other questions quite apart from the equality of the races involved in the actions of the United States to bring about the brotherhood of mankind and nations. Even if all men are equal, is it desirable or feasible to mould them into a world community? Since the social sciences fail to provide an answer here too, men must again rely on their own judgement. These questions about a world government seem reasonable and worthy of study, even if one believes that all men are equal. They receive little attention because most men who believe in the equality of all races also believe in the inevitability of the brotherhood of mankind. There is no logical connection between the equality of the races and the desirability of a world government, except that both are facets of a widespread ideological movement.

Getting back to the question of racial differences, what if the races are not equal? This raises questions far more complex than the simple assumption that all races are equal. This complexity might almost be used as an argument in favor of racial inequality, since so few things turn out to be as simple as we might wish. If the races are not equal and one desires to help mankind, then one must ask how a particular group can be helped. Can they be given a democratic form of government plus a highly technical culture? Can they absorb and use the necessary knowledge? Must they be re-educated before they can be helped? Might they be dangerous to the rest of the world if they learned to make and use modern weapons? Or are they so incompetent that they should be made wards of some more competent group? Is intermarriage between the races desirable? What should be the status of the children of such marriages?

These and many other ethical, social and political problems

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would arise in a world where the races were not equal. Answering these questions would put the more advanced nations in the rôle of playing God. In so doing they would deny the less competent groups control of their own future. Even if their actions were motivated by altruism and not selfishness they would be responsible for any harm that came to these groups.

The current belief that all races are equal, and that the brotherhood of mankind is inevitable, relieves one of having to solve these problems. It says that these problems do not exist. This belief denies that any group will be hurt by what is being done now at the same time that it justifies our actions. In one neat package it provides all that is needed to permit one to remake the world, be universally loved (almost), and be beautifully self-righteous.

What if the belief that all races are equal, and that the brotherhood of man is inevitable, is wrong? We are still forcing the world into an ideal state based on our beliefs. If our beliefs are wrong and our actions harm rather than help mankind then we will still be responsible. Mere good intentions will not absolve us from any blame we may incur. Once again then, it seems imperative that we examine our belief in the equality of the races and the brotherhood of man. We should do this for our own protection and because we have assumed a moral obligation to the world to use our power in the most sane and just manner possible. The people of the world have given us no mandate to remake the world to fit our prejudices.

THE MYTH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Sociology and the related fields of study are not sciences. They are pseudo-sciences. They lack the essential ingredient of science, which is the desire for verifiable truth. There have been a few times when these fields approached being scientific, but these have been few and far between. For the most part, they have been so swamped by the emotional tides of the times and by the personalities of people in these fields that they have made negligible progress. Is this because scientific progress in these fields is difficult and facts are so few? Partially, but it is more due to the difficulty of thinking rationally in these emotion laden areas. To investigate an area when the results may offend one's contemporaries, or even oneself, requires a rare type of man. The tragedy is that these fields of study attract the man who is least capable of this type of thinking. A man imbued with the ideals of his time, desiring to do good, desiring social approval, is the last man for such a job. These men try to benefit society in accordance with their humanistic beliefs, but they do not seek the truth.

The present state of sociology derives directly from this mixing of science and humanism. A man cannot be a humanist while

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ne is a scientist. This is not to say that a man cannot be both a humanist and a scientist. But to be a humanist while a scientist is to carry morality and ethics into an area where they have no relevance. The result is a pseudo-science because, in such a mixture, the ethical and moral considerations far outweigh the scientific. It would be better to abandon the pretense that a combination of science and humanism is anything but a means of advancing humanism. Is this conflict between science and humanism inevitable? Yes, so long as humanism takes its present form. Humanism as a philosophy is not dynamic today. It is frozen into certainty. Only the implementation of the philosophy is still a dynamic process. To humanism, as to religion, science is a potential danger. Science means change and change is a threat to any established system, particularly one that seeks to fix man's relationship to both the physical and spiritual worlds. Both humanism and religion may tolerate the physical sciences, but neither is comfortable with any real investigation into the nature of man. The existence of a science is an admission that all is not known. The existence of a social science would be an admission that there are things about man which are not known or understood—which both religion and humanism deny.

The social scientists chide the physical scientists because the latter do not make their work conform to morality. This is asking the impossible because a true science is amoral. In science a thing is or is not, it is not moral or immoral. Some will object that scientists seek the truth and that truth and morality are synonymous. Others will say that the truth will make you free. But this truth is not the scientists' truth. The scientist seeks facts which can be verified by experiment. These facts may be useful, useless, or even harmful. Such facts, like science, are amoral. They exist, they have no moral significance. True, one might assess the effect of science on society as being either good or evil if one had standards by which to judge. But who shall be the judge and what will be the criteria?

It is wrong to say that scientists are driven by a desire for truth or by a desire to help humanity. It is better that one should say that they are curious and enjoy scientific work. Scientists are playing a game whose object is to uncover some of the unknown. One learns what is already known and, with luck, adds to the store of knowledge. In acquiring the scientific knowledge which is available one begins to appreciate the immensity of man's ignorance and the utter impossibility that all will become known in one's own lifetime. This is no place for a man obsessed by a desire for complete knowledge and certainty. So it is that those who need completeness and certainty turn to religion, philosophy and humanism. Here a man can know and be sure. Thus a part of the conflict between science and humanism arises from the opposing temperaments of the two groups.

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In view of the conflict between science and humanism it is quite comprehensible that the humanists should stifle the social sciences. As sciences these could cause unwanted changes in society, or even in humanism. However, sociology as a pseudo-science is ideal for the humanists' purpose. In this form it assists in forcing society into a pattern that has already been decided upon. Under these conditions it is easy to understand the animosity of the humanists toward the physical scientists. The inventions of the physical sciences, such as nuclear weapons, have altered the humanists' world, they have made it less secure. It is difficult for the humanists, who have subverted the social sciences to their ends, to understand why the physical scientists will not or cannot make their sciences subservient to humanism. One of the strangest suggestions ever made is the humanists' suggestion that a moratorium should be declared in the physical sciences until the social sciences catch up. Even with a moratorium the social sciences could never catch up so long as the humanists control them. The humanists' concept of progress in the social sciences would be to find a way to make the world fit their preconceived ideas, and to freeze it there.

A most ludicrous possibility is that the naïve humanists might actually put the social sciences on a sound footing. The resulting sciences would indubitably be as dangerous to their ideal world as the physical sciences. Indeed, the development of true social sciences could conceivably present to mankind greater possibilities for good or evil than those presented by the development of nuclear physics.

The emphasis the humanists put on the social sciences, even as they hamper them, is a form of self-deception. It is a means of retaining the belief that the answers to the problems of humanity will soon be found. In truth, the problems that face humanity are difficult and unending. There is no science, no religion, no philosophy that will provide for mankind a quick and sure path. The ultimate responsibility for man's rise or fall is his own. He cannot delegate it to anyone or anything.

One cannot blame the humanists' crusade on the social sciences. These sciences are the victims of the crusade. Had the social sciences been more advanced, they might have retained their integrity or even moderated the extremism of the humanists. As it is, these so-called sciences accentuate the extremism because they assure the humanists that their heart's desire is based on scientific fact. One does not have to look very far to see where science has played or plays a similar rôle.

It is paradoxical that, even as some social scientists offer nonsensical advice on race relations and the like, there is evolving a true science of man. This scientific schizophrenia has one group of scientists saying that racial differences do not exist and that

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all races have the capacity for democratic self-government. Yet they do not even know if racial differences exist or what effect possible differences might have on a society's evolution. This group resembles the Greek philosophers who constructed elaborate, logical, but often erroneous explanations for everything. Like them this group tries to explain too much too fast. There is the same mixing of logic, morality, and a little science.

The other group in this scientific split personality is actually proceeding in a scientific manner to try to understand man. The results are fragmentary but they are supported by evidence. The knowledge that this group acquires is interesting, sometimes useful, and sometimes disturbing. Like the physical sciences it is likely to extend man's capabilities but unlikely to solve any ethical problems.

Unfortunately, this last group is small and not particularly vocal. The other group has captured the stage with their advice on current problems. The ability of this vocal group in the analysis of social phenomena is best illustrated by their failure to realize that they have been caught in one of the ideological movements of the twentieth century.

ARE ALL INTELLECTUALS COMMUNISTS?

It is foolish to say that all intellectuals are communists, yet it is equally incorrect to say that they are strongly anti-communist. They are against Russian communism because of its obvious faults, but they are not necessarily against theoretical communism. Communist theory may or may not appeal to many of them since the motives of the present day intellectuals resemble those of the early communists. They want to use the government as a tool for social progress. Most American intellectuals are willing to work within the framework of existing institutions, although they have no qualms about reinterpreting the law to suit their own ends. Unlike the communists, they see no real need for a violent revolution. In a sense they are following a path parallel to that of the communists. Both paths start with the same motive, the desire to help man, and end at the same goal, a Utopian society.

The communist path lays out a well defined plan by which the Utopian society can be reached. Communists consider a tight, well organized group essential in achieving their goal. By their lights any means are justified in reaching their goal since the goal so far transcends conventional morality. In contrast, the path that the American intellectuals are following does not require a well defined plan. However, there are definite goals. By taking every opportunity the intellectuals are successfully pushing their program. They pressure Congress, the executive branch, and they propagandize. They try to make everyone believe, as they believe,

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that what they advocate is the only logical extension of American evolution. They are extremists in their beliefs, even if not so extreme as the communists.

In spite of the differences in the means that they employ to reach their goals, the similarity of the communists and the intellectuals is obvious. The intellectuals propose ever greater welfare plans which, if carried to the extreme, can only approach the communists' "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need." In both movements there is the same absolute classification of people as heroes or villains, and the same quasi-religious overtone to the movements. Both the intellectuals and the communists have an infinite faith in their ability to mould humanity into an ideal state, and both are obsessed with the necessity of obtaining this ultimate state immediately. Yet neither of these groups has ever considered who should be trusted with the great power required for such a step. Both groups simply assume, if they ever think about it, that it is they who should set the world right. Similarly, both the intellectuals and the communists are so convinced of the ultimate morality of their movements that they seem amoral by conventional standards.

Neither the intellectuals nor the communists are actually interested in democracy in the usual sense, although both make a big point of using the word. They know that what they believe is right and they have neither respect nor tolerance for anyone who disagrees with them. They show every intention of re-educating everyone who opposes them. Both groups may go through the motions of tolerating opposition but neither will tolerate effective opposition. This is a regression in the evolution of democracy, not progress. It is an attempt to freeze society into a form predicated on a single group's concept of an ideal state. To achieve such a state the intellectuals and the communists feel that the government should use every device of the modern state to mould the minds of its citizens. Once they are properly indoctrinated they may be permitted to voice approval of "their" government in free elections. Truly, this is a more grotesque form of tyranny than any previously known.

Yet those who would implement such a state are doubly secure, both in the realization that what they do is for the common good, and in the realization that they are not acting for personal gain. But in the end they forge chains for those they would help and ultimately for themselves. They are betrayed by their naïve willingness to trust governments with absolute power. This naïveté has characterized the followers of most of the ideologies of the twentieth century. Socialism, communism, Fascism, and the current intellectual crusade, require that their followers bow to the state for the good of the group as a whole. In so doing there is confusion between the interests of the state and the people. Even

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the movements that begin by emphasizing the importance of the individual finally end in exalting the state as the individual's guardian.

There is a strange absoluteness in the societies proposed by each of these movements. Each proposes to solve all social, economic and political problems. Once the movement is triumphant there will be no need for the continued evolution of society because society will have been perfected. The emergence and widespread acceptance of so many similar ideologies in the twentieth century may represent an attempt to find a stable, secure social organization in an age of technology. The social structure of feudal times dissolved with the advent of the industrial age and has never been replaced by anything comparable. If there is a need by mankind for a social system comparable to that which existed in feudal times then the current ideologies may be attempts to find such a society. Under these conditions it would hardly be surprising if the ideologies tended to embrace a man's entire life and define his social, political and economic activities. In addition such movements would have to replace or complement the existing religions.

The necessity that a current ideology must harmonize all areas of human activity could explain the interest of the American intellectuals in the social, economic and political evolution of American society. If their ideology is to be fulfilled they must mould every aspect of society into conformity with their beliefs. To do this they must shape the people's thinking to conform with their own. Still, the intellectuals recognize the dangers of a dictatorship, so their ideology provides that the people will control the government. In such a state the government would mould the people and the people would influence the government. The result is a closed loop containing both the people and the government, whose abnormally strong interaction should magnify every human virtue, or every human fault. Such a state would seem basically unstable. Recent history seems to indicate that the evolution of such a state is unlikely. Once the government is given the power to implement such a state it seems to fall into a stable dictatorship, which pays lip service to the original ideology but which exercises wide control over the people without being responsible to them.

Nonetheless, there is a certain greatness in these movements. They evoke the vision of a nation or mankind united against the foe. They give their believers a sense of belonging and a certainty of belief which are forever denied to free men. At the same time, there is tragedy in such movements because mankind in the grip of one of the current ideologies is insane.

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Modern ideologies appear to arise from mankind's need for security in an age when technical progress has destroyed most security. No longer can a man be reasonably self-sufficient. He must depend on others for food, shelter, work, and assistance when in distress. No longer is there a society in which his work and economic status are decided for him, his social station set, and his relationship to other men well defined. Instead all is chaos. He must seek work with no guarantee that he can find it. Having found work there is no guarantee that it will last. No matter what his position he cannot be sure that he will not be dropped or replaced as society evolves. The changes that occur force him to go to new places and meet new people whether he wishes it or not. He does not know if the society in which he finds himself will make him free or, with equal capriciousness, make him a slave. Even if he finds a good place in society he has no assurance that the entire society will not dissolve as the result of some technical advance or financial catastrophe.

The modern ideologies of socialism, communism, Fascism, and the quasi-ideology of the American intellectuals, meet man's need for security in this age. Differing as they do in detail, all nonetheless offer mankind political, social and economic security. They assure man a permanent dependable society on which he can rely. In these societies technology is rendered harmless. It becomes a tool of mankind through government control. No longer does it enslave man or cast him aside as useless.

All the ideologies go further than merely making provision for man's physical well-being. To give him emotional security they must reconcile all political, social and economic conflicts lest the society they propose appear insecure. They must give the impression of absolute permanence. They must be logically self-consistent, based on apparent fact or science, and they must be consistent with man's ethical or religious beliefs. It is as though mankind, so long deprived of reasonable security, will now settle for no less than complete security.

Mankind, liberated from poverty by the advent of the age of technology, saw no limit to what man might achieve. But war, depression, and other social dislocations blunted this optimism so that men began to doubt that they alone, or in combination, could be masters of their own fates. So men sought a new way. They could not turn to religion, though this had been their solace when they were so poor that the next world was the only hope. They still hoped that science and technology meant a good life for them, even if they could not achieve this by themselves. Here appeared the ideologies, the religions of this world. Just as the usual religions offer certainty and comfort about the next world, the

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ideologies offer certainty and comfort about this one. Religions depend on training, man's fears of the next world, and on faith. In a similar way the ideologies depend on indoctrination, man's need for security in this world, and on faith. Faith is important. Even though ideologies are started by men they must not appear to be mere creations of man. They must appear to have a scientific, a divine, or an ethical origin that lifts them above the foibles of mankind. Only in this way can man have faith in them.

Are these ideologies the salvation of mankind? Certainly Fascism led Germany and Italy to disaster. Communism flourishes, but do those under it appreciate it? Socialism has failed as often as it has succeeded. Even the ideology of the American intellectual often fails in practice. But still these movements attract mankind, for they fill an emotional need. They assure man that the world is or can be a simple and secure place, not a place where man's only salvation is his own ability and where even that may fail. Even as they seduce man with their seeming logic they betray him with their unreason. They make men insane. For a man who believes in an ideology has withdrawn from the real world and moved into a new world. Not a private world, as in individual insanity, but a world peopled by his fellow ideologues. Here things have their agreed meaning, here the unbelievers can be seen acting out their futile, irrational lives. There may be minor alarms here, but no one doubts that they are caught in a tide that sweeps to the fulfilment of the movement.

In just such ideological insanity are the American intellectuals enmeshed. They believe in the equality of all men, in the brotherhood of man, and in the desire and capacity of all men for democratic self-government. Taken together, these lead to a belief that the inevitable and proper course of human evolution leads to national governments and ultimately to a world government based on the brotherhood of man. Under these governments all men, with the assistance of modern technology, will enjoy freedom, prosperity and happiness. The intellectuals do not consider their belief that such a world will evolve to be a matter of faith. Instead they feel that they comprehend the true nature of man and that their beliefs rest on this comprehension. These beliefs do not form an arbitrary mould into which humanity is to be forced. Instead, the efforts of the intellectuals are to facilitate the evolution of man into the natural and proper state. It must be said that this is the "proper" sate for it is more than merely natural. This state is consonant with man's ethical and religious nature. There is an implication that, because it is the natural state and because it fits man's ethical and religious beliefs, it somehow transcends man and rests on some divine or ultimate principle.

This is the basis for the intellectual's ideology. These self-consistent beliefs lead to an ideology which encompasses man's

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social, economic and political evolution. By elaborating on these beliefs one can understand the past, the present and the future. By acting according to these precepts, a man can advance his and mankind's interests. Not all those who are motivated by this ideology fully comprehend its basis or its implications. They know that the part that they understand and believe is consistent. They feel that if they took the time they could comprehend the entire thing. They are correct in their belief in the logic and consistency of this ideology. Their error lies in their belief that the ideology corresponds to reality. The very fact that the ideology is simple, comprehensible and emotionally satisfying should make it suspect as a picture of reality.

Consider the belief of the intellectuals that all races are inherently equal. This belief has two bases. One is the appeal of this belief alone, and the other is the appeal of the ideology to which this belief is essential. A part of this belief's appeal lies in its ethical and religious simplicity. If all races are equal there are no complex and difficult problems inherent in the relationship between races. In addition, a lack of equality will raise questions about a God or universe which permits a group to comprehend its inferiority and be unable to do anything about it. In many ways the American intellectuals' belief that all races are equal represents an elaboration of the American belief that some men should be legally equal. The evolution of the intellectuals' ideology was influenced by this belief, with the result that the belief was incorporated into the ideology and extended to include the equality of all races. In its extended form this belief not only requires the legal equality of the races but also justifies this equality by maintaining that all races are essentially identical. The same necessity for justifying the legal equality of men apparently troubled the founders of the United States. They felt that legal equality was desirable but were not certain that it was feasible, even though the legal equality they envisaged was not nearly so all encompassing as that in the intellectuals' ideology. Even though many of the early advocates of legal equality tried to find some absolute justification for this equality it is obvious that many of them were never wholly convinced that it would work.

The contrast between the pragmatic attitude of many of the founders of the United States and the fanatical certainty of the intellectuals is striking. It illustrates the extent to which an ideology dominates the thinking of those who subscribe to it. It is impossible to be a rational ideologue. The absoluteness of the ideology and its inevitable conflict with reality must eventually warn any rational man of its true nature. The ideologue, on the other hand, glories in the absoluteness of the ideology and the emotional security which this brings. Because an ideologue is so passionately

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attached to his ideology he must exercise most of his rational ability reconciling reality and his ideology. Even if he has the ability he has not the slightest inclination to analyse his ideology, for once committed to an ideology a man can escape only at the expense of a severe mental and emotional shock.

If, for instance, an ideologue's belief in the equality of all races is questioned, he is not capable of considering the alternatives rationally. In a real sense he cannot even doubt his belief in racial equality, because he would also have to doubt the entire ideology which depends on this belief.

In the same way, an intellectual must believe in the brotherhood of men, not in the abstract sense, but in the sense that men are naturally cooperative, rational, and devoted to the common good. This natural man must not be merely passive, he must be willing actively to advance the welfare of mankind, even on a world-wide basis. In the intellectuals' view such a man is the natural man. A man who is different has been warped by his environment and must be cured or prevented from doing any harm to the evolution of the society of true men. Because of this belief in the innate brotherhood of mankind, the intellectuals do not feel that the form of society they are forcing on the United States and the world is artificial. If brotherhood were an artificial state which required constant attention by an external force for its existence, the ideology of the intellectuals would not be emotionally satisfying. Instead it would guarantee those who tried to implement it perpetual trouble. To avoid this problem, brotherhood must be a state which, once mankind achieves it, is self-sustaining.

There is no evidence that the intellectuals' belief in the brotherhood of man has any real foundation in fact. Yet the intellectuals, for the sake of their ideology, must believe that a drive toward brotherhood is innate in man. Not only must they believe, they must act on this belief.

As the intellectuals must believe in the equality and brotherhood of men, so must they believe in the desire of men for democratic self-government and the ability of all men to form such governments. This belief in the ability of all races to govern themselves democratically almost restricts the intellectuals' belief in the equality of races to being a belief in the identity of the races. Races could differ in some ways and still be considered roughly equal. However, the assertion that all races are desirous of, and capable of, democratic self-government with no qualification appears to mean that all races are identical, in this respect at least.

As with the other beliefs of the intellectuals there is little evidence to support this belief. Yet no other belief is acceptable because only this one will combine with the others to yield the Utopian society which the intellectuals must believe is evolving. It would do no good if all men were equal and capable of self-

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government but had no drive toward universal brotherhood. This would mean the possibility of an indefinite series of wars between democratically governed groups, plus group conflicts within each democracy. On the other hand, a lack of racial equality almost guarantees that some groups cannot participate fully in the proposed new world. This would create difficult ethical problems for the more advanced groups and would cast doubt on the ethical absoluteness of the ideology. A lack of ability in any group to govern themselves democratically would create both practical and ethical problems.

Strangely enough, not one of these essential qualities is missing. The ideologues claim that their belief that man has the characteristics necessary for the ultimate attainment of a Utopian society rests on their comprehension of human nature. This seems far fetched. It seems more likely that their beliefs about the nature of man stem from their obsession with attaining the Utopian state. There is much talk about the scientific proof of racial equality by the social sciences. These so-called proofs indicate nothing except the subservience of these sciences to the intellectuals' ideology. The sciences must be either subservient or in open conflict with the ideology. Even if the scientists themselves do not oppose the ideology their work must not contradict the beliefs of the ideologues or they will be at war with the ideology. This conflict is inevitable since all ideologies are by nature totalitarian. All men must subscribe to the ideology or abide by it if the ideology is to be fulfilled.

This same intolerance is carried over into the political, social and economic spheres. There is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with any ideology. The ideology gives its members certain absolute beliefs which must be acted on if the ideology is to be fulfilled. Anyone who opposes the ideology must be re-educated, rendered harmless, or eliminated. For an ideologue to acknowledge that it is not essential that his ideology should finally triumph, as would be required for permanent peaceful coexistence, is for him to deny the absoluteness of the ideology.

All ideologues have complete faith in the governments that they plan to implement because all ideologies require absolute faith in the good nature of man. Natural men, such as the ideologues consider themselves to be, who are unfettered by class interests and prejudice, could not and would not abuse the powers of the government. There is also an explicit or implicit belief in every ideology that some form of government must direct mankind to its new and higher state. This rôle of government is stated explicitly in the communist ideology and is implicit in the ideology of the American intellectuals.

All ideologies, even when they preach democracy, are menaces to real democracy. Ideologies bind their followers to an inflexible set of beliefs so that, no matter how many mistakes they make

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or how much human suffering they cause, they must always pursue the same course. In addition, the ideologies deny the right of existence to any beliefs contrary to those of the ideology. These beliefs are either simple error or a sign of some corruptness which must be eliminated. This intolerance of opposition, combined with the belief that the state has a legitimate right to mould the thinking of its citizens, makes some form of totalitarian state inevitable whenever an ideology wins control of a government.

THE NEW WORLD

A new world is coming. All men, black, white, red, brown and yellow will live together in peace and harmony. Russia and China will realize that all men have a common goal and will join with the rest of the world to achieve this goal. Men will tolerate, even love, one another as they work together for the common good. The resources of mankind will be mobilized to meet the threats of war, hunger, disease and poverty. Over all this will reign a benevolent and just world government. The happiest of all men will be the intellectuals who brought this about. Surely they will not go unhonored. The sole problem may be to keep the lion from lying down with the lamb before the ceremony which will celebrate the achievement of Utopia.

In the United States white and black will mingle without self-consciousness. Perhaps they will even pause occasionally to give one another Christian, or perhaps Black Muslim, kisses of love. Government will cease to be the tool of special interests and will insure that every man has a decent place to live, enough food, a good education, and the right beliefs. Businessmen will repent of their evil ways and make their employees' and customers' welfare their first concern. Workers will love their employers and their fellow workers. They will not think of striking because the world depends on them. It is such a good and beautiful world that science, the magic genie who must be properly controlled, will indubitably provide everyone with haloes.

Is this not a vision to enchant mankind? And in the enchantment must not one believe that the world is moving toward this Utopia? For to believe is to make it so. And, if one believe, is one's intolerance of those who hinder the vision not excusable? And can any amount of sympathy be too great for those who have been denied the vision by unbelievers?

Yet, with just such tortured logic, made reasonable by their fanaticism, do the new fanatics preserve their belief in the imminence of a brave new world. They cannot say, "We have decided to help the Negro. We are going to educate him, teach him a trade, make him honest and law abiding, teach him to be a good citizen in a democracy (because citizens in a democracy must

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be more than merely law abiding). We then expect to make a new place for him in American Society." They cannot say this because their creed has no place for a group that is culturally or innately inferior. Such groups would have to be told what to do and this would prove that they are inferior. This cannot be. World democracy is safe and inevitable only because all men are equal and capable of democratic self-government. Men need only to be set free and they will immediately establish true and responsible democracy. Their failure to do so is always indicative of some malign influence at work.

This fanatical thinking is a synthesis of the environmental and the hereditary theories of human behavior. It attributes all faults to environment and makes all desirable characteristics innate in man. Thus the intellectuals are obsessed with the necessity of creating an environment which will bring out the good innate in all people. To do this they must be given control of society, because they alone are the enlightened ones—they have broken the chains of environment and seen the vision.

But are the intellectuals rational, or have they surrendered their reason to a delicious insanity? There have always been men willing to devote their lives to any cause, no matter how sublime or how ridiculous. To which category does the intellectual crusade belong? In spite of the apparent logic of their thought and their good intentions the intellectuals are still dangerous. They are fanatics and are all the more dangerous for the innocence of their motives. They forget that more evil is done by well intentioned men than is ever consciously plotted.

Why are such men dangerous? Because their ideology and natural inclinations impel them to take control. Once in control they must force the world to fit their preconceived ideas. Why do the Russians keep trying to collectivize agriculture no matter how many times they fail? Why must they believe that the western world is decadent, peopled by impoverished workers, and controlled by the capitalists? They must believe this for the same reason that the intellectuals must believe that school desegregation will have good results and that giving everyone the right to vote will make a better society. The ideology says these things are so and there can be no question of their correctness. To question these beliefs is the sign of a criminal or a revisionist. When, for instance, the South objects that segregation is the only means of maintaining a reasonable level of White civilization in the area there are sniggers. Everyone knows this is blind prejudice speaking. No one listens if Southerners ask if the North intends that every southern city should become another Washington, another Chicago, or another New York. Are the white citizens to be driven to the suburbs and the cities filled with Negroes flocking to the intellectuals' promised land. Must the same cycle repeat? The

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schools will be desegregated and resegregated as the Whites move out. The crime rate will climb, welfare cost will rise, taxes must go up. The city officials, in response to their new citizens' petulant disappointment in not finding the promised land, will blame the residents of the suburbs, blame housing segregation, blame everything but the new citizens.

In contrast to this picture, the South may point out that its cities are reasonably safe for their inhabitants, that Negroes in these cities are largely self-supporting, and that the imperfections in the Negro schools merely indicate the Negroes' lack of interest in education. If not many Negroes vote, they may point out that white people appear only marginally capable of self-government and the Negroes even less so. One may refute these arguments by pointing out that school and housing segregation, economic and voting discrimination are bad, bad, bad; anywhere, everywhere, and forever more.

This frantic belief in the equality of men and the ability of all men to be good citizens in a democracy appears particularly prevalent in some parts of the North. Could it be that some immigrants were so worried about being good citizens that they had to assure everyone that citizenship in a democracy is elementary? Of course there is the old bugaboo of the saying about founding a democracy that begins and ends with, "Take Englishmen."

In all seriousness, the qualities needed in a citizen of a democracy would seem to be more than that he be human. He must be able to manage his own affairs, or how can he be expected to manage those of the state? He must be willing to sacrifice his wealth and sometimes his life for the state. Yet he must be willing to say to the state, "Thus far and no further," when it threatens his liberty. Where does one find or how does one make such a man? Here again our invaluable ally, social science, fails to come to our aid. No matter, we have survived thus far without it and may yet last a day or two. Perhaps we shall choose as citizens those who resemble previous good citizens. If others should ask for citizenship we will grant it slowly so that if they do harm it will be small.

It may be that the state that results will not be perfect, but who expects perfection in this world?

A D D E N D U M

An additional comment on a point not made clear previously seems in order at this point. The ideology of the American intellectuals places them at a great disadvantage in the contest with communism. Because the goals of the communists and the

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intellectuals are practically identical the intellectuals cannot hate communism as they hate Fascism. Their argument with communism is over means, not goals. This lack of any basic disagreement with the communists disarms the intellectuals in their dealings with the communists. This is particularly true since the ideology of the American intellectuals assumes that all men are reasonable and cooperative. This leads to a perpetual expectation on the part of the intellectuals that the communists will moderate their extremism. This moderation of the communists' stand is greatly to be desired since there would then be no major disagreement between the intellectuals and the communists. As a result the intellectuals avoid any action that might accentuate the extremism of the communists. If they can avoid putting any pressure on the communists, they feel that the communists must inevitably relax their extreme stance and take a more natural and cooperative position.

The communists seem aware of this desire of the intellectuals to maneuver them into a more flexible position. The communists turn this desire to their own advantage by making minor concessions in return for major concessions from the intellectuals. These major concessions are not made for value received but in the hopes of further softening the communists' attitudes. The communists recognize the similarity of aims which makes a proposal from them less objectionable to the intellectuals than a proposal from the Fascists. At the same time the communists take a harsher and, in many ways, more realistic view of the world. In their view the attainment of their goals is going to involve conflict and setbacks. The almost painless evolution of a Utopian society which the American intellectuals forsee must seem hopelessly naïve to the communists. This naïveté of the American intellectuals probably means that the communists could never work with them as partners in achieving their goals. The communists may use the intellectuals but they would never rely on them.

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LEGAL TESTIMONY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: A CONTRAST

By C. P. ARMSTRONG, S. S. CRUTCHFIELD, W. E. HOY AND R. E. KUTTNER

It is a common belief, frequently stated, that the Supreme Court decision to end school segregation rested in considerable measure on the testimony of social scientists. The Hon. James O. Eastland, who opposes desegregation, claimed in a Senate speech that *Brown v. Board of Education* and related cases were decided ". . . solely and alone on scientific authority," and in a resolution repeated the charge: "Whereas this decision was based solely and alone on phychological, sociological, and anthropological considerations. . . ."[1]

Professor Kenneth B. Clark, who long campaigned for integration, likewise felt that social science data strongly influenced the Supreme Court. He wrote that ". . . social science testimony in these cases was an extension of the legal frontiers,"[2] and elsewhere that "The Court's decision also took into account a growing body of knowledge in psychology and the social sciences, the result of extensive research into the development of racial attitudes and the effect of prejudice on the development of American children."[3]

These views are sometimes disputed by those who hold an intermediate position, *e.g.*, ". . . both the Eastlands and the Clarks overstate their case."[4] An article by Professor Cahn is often cited to prove that the Court did not base its ruling on scientific data.[5] Behind such efforts is the fear that a change in the scientific climate might result in an ultimate reversal. Nevertheless, some social scientists refer to the Court order to end segregation as the "Ken Clark law" in tribute to the Negro psychologist and NAACP witness.[6]

[1] Hon. James O. Eastland, "The Supreme Court's 'Modern Scientific Authorities' in the Segregation Cases," Senate Speech, 26th May 1955.

[2] Clark, K. B., "Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence," *J. Social Issues*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1953, pp. 6-8.

[3] Clark, K. B., *Prejudice and Your Child*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1955, p. 11.

[4] Blaustein, A. P., and Ferguson, C. C., *Desegregation and the Law*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1957, p. 135.

[5] Cahn, E., "Jurisprudence," *N.Y.U.L. Rev.*, Vol. 30, 1955, p. 150.

[6] Kuenzli, A. E., "Ethical Implications of the Social Sciences," *Educational Theory*, Vol. 7, 1957, p. 71.

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The controversy stems from footnote 11 in the opinion delivered by Mr Chief Justice Warren on 17th May 1954. The footnote referred to authorities who were believed to have established that segregation when sanctioned by law damaged Negro citizens. How much the Court relied on such evidence cannot be established from the printed word, but it seems improbable that a scientific reference would have been used if it exerted no influence whatever on the decision-making of a single member of the Court. It is natural to conclude: "The Court thus rested its decision on the scientific knowledge developed and the conclusions established by the social scientists as expert witnesses,"[7] since the new knowledge available since *Plessy v. Ferguson* 58 years earlier is stated to be phychological in the very text of the opinion. The decision is regarded as a signal to social scientists to open new constitutional horizons.

In the use of social science data there are several limitations that must be recognised in advance. First, scientists are reluctant to make public any observation or opinion that might arouse group animosities, or reflect an unfavorable light on a social or ethnic group. Social scientists in particular are averse to making such statements. The obvious reason for this is that the lessons of the Nazi era show that a misused science can ignite dangerous passions. A Yale University biologist writes: "When we ask about the variability in the psychological sphere, we too often find silence. Because entirely erroneous theories have been used in front of our eyes to promote the most horrible tragedies known to history, the whole subject is in great danger of becoming a forbidden area."[8] At a scientific meeting an eminent geneticist, Professor Theodosius Dobzhansky, found it necessary to admonish an eminent anthropologist, Professor Carleton Coon, for producing a new work on human evolution that provided raw material for racist propaganda.[9] Professor Dobzhansky further remarked that scientists can no longer remain in ivory towers unconcerned over the impact of their theories.

A second point is that social scientists are governed by a code of ethics, official or understood, which places real restraints on their testimony. This is cogently presented by the well known anthropologist, Dr Margaret Mead, who explains that the subject of study, the human group, is regarded as a client ". . . who must be protected from exposure to adverse political or social

[7] Fischman, B. D., "As Viewed by a Lawyer," *The Role of the Social Sciences in Desegregation: A Symposium,* Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, New York, August 1958, p. 7.

[8] Hutchinson, G. E., "Homo Nosce Te Ipsum" (Marginalia), *American Scientist,* Vol. 45, January 1957, pp. 91-92.

[9] Cited in *Science,* Vol. 139, 15th February 1963, p. 638, a report on an anthropology meeting by the secretary, Eleanor Leacock.

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pressures."[10] On page 8 of her article we read: "An anthropologist who, for example, makes a speech and refers to another culture is responsible for so phrasing his reference that it will not hurt or insult the people about whom he speaks or to whom he speaks." And on page 10 of the same article she says: "It is, perhaps, in the realm of genetics, constitutional differences, and learned differences in national character that the greatest confusion has arisen and that anthropologists have shown the least capacity for scientific detachment. Any suggestion that one group of individuals may be innately or experientially superior to any other is likely to meet with intense resistance." Further down on the page we read: "Additionally, we have to consider the effects of our materials if they are presented to a lay audience. . . ."

The above demonstrates some of the inhibitions placed on social scientists. The instincts of many witnesses would recoil from delivering unsavory testimony about a group before a panel with the means to circulate such findings widely, or before a court of law hearing a case of spectacular interest to both journalists and the public at large.

A scientist is expected to be unambiguous so far as this is possible. When he is uncertain of his data, or hesitant about its interpretation, he must make this explicit so that those who wish to use or extend his work are not confused by it. A witness before a court carries less of a burden. He need satisfy only cross examination, and sometimes a simple opinion is sufficient. The difference between legal testimony and scientific evidence is often the difference between opinion and proof. Since a court of law is not a laboratory, opinions can be contested only by other opinions, and the average attorney is not equipped to penetrate the formidable sanctity that surrounds the testimony of a witness credited with the expertise of his discipline.

In the desegregation cases, it was charged by Professor Ernest van den Haag that Professor Kenneth B. Clark gave misleading testimony. He states that Clark knew that the question in dispute was whether school segregation damaged Negro children, and that Clark obscured the issue with tangential testimony concerning damage caused by living in a segregated society.[11] It is further emphasized by van den Haag that had Clark scrutinized his own data objectively he would have had evidence to prove the opposite of his testimony. Clark himself had identified the symptoms of damage in Negro children as ". . . confusion in the individuals and

[10] Mead, M., "The Social Responsibility of the Anthropologist," *Journal of Higher Education,* Vol. 33, January 1962, pp. 1-12.

[11] Haag, E. van den, "Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases: A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark," *Vill. L. Rev.,* Vol. 6, Fall 1960, pp. 69-79.

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their concepts about themselves conflicting in their self images."[12] If this is the criterion which Clark chose to employ, then van den Haag rightly observes that the research carried out by Clark demonstrates greater injury to Negro children in mixed northern schools than in segregated southern schools.

A report on research conducted by Professor Clark contains tables which reveal that in so far as a doll test could establish concepts of racial identity, Negro children in mixed northern schools thought they resembled a white doll 39% of the time (Table 4), while a smaller number of segregated southern Negro children (29%) made this mistake.[13] In another table (Table 8), it was shown that more southern than northern Negro children preferred to play with colored dolls, more felt that the colored doll was a "nice doll," and fewer said that the colored doll "looks bad." Professor Clark thus demonstrated that the segregated students were less confused, had better self-images, and manifested a smaller amount of self-hatred. These are precisely the items which Clark felt were indicators of segregation damage. Van den Haag sees two possible explanations for the fact that Clark could bring himself to testify—either he did not understand the results, or he sought to mislead the Court.

There is no answer to the dilemma posed by van den Haag. Professor Clark recognized the contradictions in his data: "the southern children, however, in spite of their equal favorableness toward the white doll, are significantly less likely to reject the brown doll (evaluate it negatively), as compared to the strong tendency for the northern children to do so."[13] Elsewhere, Clark manages to invent an interpretation that is more agreeable to him than the data itself: "On the surface, these findings might suggest that northern Negro children suffer more personality damage from racial prejudice and discrimination than southern Negro children. However, this interpretation would seem to be not only superficial but incorrect. The apparent emotional stability of the southern Negro child may be indicative of the fact that through rigid racial segregation and isolation he has accepted as normal the fact of his inferior social status."[14]

With this manipulation, Clark bestows on the Negro child (as young as three years) the ability to identify the color "brown" with position on the socio-economic scale. Since Clark's doll test failed to reveal school segregation injury, he makes the totally unwarranted assumption that the test actually measures socio-

[12] Cahn, E., "Jurisprudence," *N.Y.U.L. Rev.*, Vol. 30, 1955, p. 162.

[13] Clark, K. B., and Clark, M. P., "Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children," *Readings in Social Psychology* (edited by T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley), Henry Holt, New York, 1947, pp. 169-178.

[14] Clark, K. B., *Prejudice and Your Child*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1955, p. 45.

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economic status. He is free to make any interpretation he chooses to escape from the embarrassing contradictions implicit in his data, but since the test was never legitimized for the use Clark puts it to he cannot expect his logic to be popular with scientists accustomed to more exacting standards of research.

At the same time, Clark acknowledges that social science, including his own work, fell short of the purpose to which the NAACP sought to apply it. When the NAACP lawyers asked for "... evidence showing public school segregation, in itself, damaged the personalities of Negro children," Clark wrote, "it was pointed out to them that the available studies had so far not isolated this single variable from the total social complexity of racial prejudices, discrimination, and segregation. It was therefore not possible to testify on the psychologically damaging effects of segregated schools alone."[15] Clark therefore honestly informed his employers that the evidence they wanted was not available, and it may be presumed that, knowing this, Clark would not have willfully misled the Court on this matter.

Yet it is apparent that the Clark testimony raised a cloud of confusion. To van den Haag it appears that Clark did imply special knowledge about the harm engendered by school segregation. Van den Haag appears, however, to be judging the performance of Professor Clark from the standpoint of a scientist. Crucial, but unresolved, are the questions: (1) Was Clark obliged to volunteer the fact that his research strengthened the opposition's case? (2) Was he bound to expose or clarify the general nature of his evidence, assuming it to be valid, so that the lower court would have no doubts that he was directing his testimony toward the issue of social segregation and its supposed consequences, and not school segregation? (3) Was he contributing data as a scientist or as a legal witness? This last point carries great weight in any assessment of the Clark matter. For if it could be decided whether a witness called to testify as a scientist is bound by the rules of scientific honesty, then an easy solution to the van den Haag dilemma emerges.

A scientist, on any occasion when he functions as a scientist, is obliged by the ethics of his profession to render full and frank answers to the questions posed to him. This also means admitting the limitations of his knowledge, fairly evaluating the sources of error in his data, and doing the utmost to avoid or dispel any doubts or confusions he might inadvertently have generated in the minds of his audience. If this overriding set of values can be considered to be governing on the conduct of a scientist even when under the lesser demands placed on legal witnesses, then

[15] Clark, K. B., "The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role," *Vill. L. Rev.*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1960, p. 231.

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Professor Clark is guilty of falling tragically short of this ideal in his rôle as a NAACP expert on social science. A scientist, as a scientist, cannot depend on cross examination to develop or establish scientific truth; the obligation to do this is inherent in the exercise of the profession itself.

When Professor Clark disagrees with others he insists on high standards of scientific objectivity. In reference to another matter he writes: "It is necessary to point out that Dr Conant's prestige is not an adequate substitute for hard evidence. . . . He does not offer one single bit of evidence. . . . Like most personal opinion, untested by objective research and the evaluation of evidence, it reflects his background, his status, real and perceived, his own ambivalence and conflicts in areas relevant to race."[16] Could not the same words apply to Professor Clark himself?

[16] Clark, K. B., "Interracial Justice: Our Common Task," *Interracial Review*, Vol. 34, No. 11, December 1961, pp. 306-308.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

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DOBZHANSKY'S 'EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY' CONCEPT

By H. GEORGE CLASSEN

In his widely acclaimed recent work, *Mankind Evolving* (Yale University Press, 1962), Professor Theodosius Dobzhansky expresses the view that the denial of equal occupational opportunity to groups or individuals that differ, or appear to differ, genetically from a dominant group works to the detriment of mankind as a whole, since it "stultifies the genetic diversity" of mankind and inhibits "optimal utilization of the wealth of the gene pool of the human species." He further states that true equality of opportunity is, at present, but a beautiful and desirable dream, and that those societies which have approached it more or less closely have been more successful than those which denied it.

The slogan of "equal opportunity" is, of course, also being proclaimed on political and ethical grounds, but Dobzhansky's book is clearly intended to be scientific. In other words, any similarity between current political agitation and Dobzhansky's concept seems to be accidental. Whether this is true or not is for the moment irrelevant; the scientific arguments which in Dobzhansky's book precede the proclamation of his concept, and the importance which he assigns to the latter, demand that we should give it serious and impartial consideration.

It is my thesis that such an examination will show that Dobzhansky's equal-opportunity concept is Utopian and, by definition, outside the range of social possibilities.

In his book, Dobzhansky offers several definitions of his equal-opportunity concept. Probably the most comprehensive is found on page 243: "Equality of opportunity neither presupposes nor promises equality of ability. It only means that every person may, without favor, or hindrance, develop whatever socially useful gifts or aptitudes he has and chooses to develop. Civilization fosters a multitude of employments and functions to be filled and served —statesmen and butchers, engineers and policemen, scientists and refuse collectors, musicians and salesclerks. Equality of opportunity stimulates the division of labor rather than sets it aside; it enables, however, a person to choose any occupation for which he is qualified by his abilities and his willingness to strive."

Dobzhansky is most explicit in denying any environmentalist or equalitarian bias. On the contrary, he states that his concept is bound to emphasize hereditary differences: "The closer the approach to equality of opportunity in a society, the more the

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observed differences between its members are likely to reflect their genetic differences. Inequality of opportunity acts, on the contrary, to hide, distort, and falsify the genetic diversity" (pages 246-247).

Dobzhansky also has an answer for those who might say that equal opportunity would merely demonstrate what is already obvious, *e.g.*, that Negroes are on the average less intelligent than Whites: "The decisive point . . . is that nobody can discover the cultural capacities of human individuals, populations or races until they have been given something like an equality of opportunity to demonstrate these capacities" (page 286).

These quotations could be added to, but I believe that they are sufficient to reflect fairly and accurately the gist of Dobzhansky's concept, or grand design, for social regeneration.

Few will deny that, on the face of it, it is an attractive, even seductive vision. It appears to answer effectively both the equalitarian and the hereditarian doctrines, and to be both just and efficient. It is, nonetheless, Utopian.

All originators of Utopian schemes share one fallacy: out of the infinite variety of human capacities and experiences they extract one and, after pronouncing it absolute and constant, refer and subordinate all other variants to it. Thus Plato, in his *Republic*, pronounced knowledge of the *Good* to be absolute and constant, and by endowing his philosopher-king with it made him arbiter of society. More recently, Karl Marx pronounced the needs and cravings of all men equal; once artificial property distinctions had been destroyed men would naturally live together in equal and unregimented enjoyment of the fruits of their common labor.

The fictitious constant in Dobzhansky's equal-opportunity Utopia is "social usefulness." If we look again at the first quotation we shall see without difficulty that this is in fact the operative term. Even if the words "socially useful" had not been used by the author this would not change his concept, for the idea of social usefulness is inherent in the idea of "occupation" or "function."

Since equal opportunity is to be granted only to bearers of socially useful gifts, Dobzhansky's Utopia is predicated on the knowability of social usefulness, just as Plato's Republic is predicated on the knowability of the Good.

To use a parable, Dobzhansky's equal-opportunity concept envisages civilization as a drama with ready-made rôles, and the collective conscience of society as the casting director whose task it is to see that each rôle is filled with the best-suited actor. But if civilization can be likened to a drama at all, it is a drama in which each actor constantly extemporizes, changing his lines and his rôles together with the plot and the duration of the play itself.

The only criterion common to all occupations is that they are rewarded by society, either directly or indirectly through a guar-

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antee. Thus our own society rewards soldiers, for example, and will enforce payment for services rendered by a barber; it will not enforce payment for services rendered by a prostitute. Prostitution is not, therefore, a recognized or "socially useful" occupation in our society, though it has been such in many societies in the past, and may become so in our own. If it does, and if members of a minority ethnic group should happen to possess special aptitude for prostitution, they would presumably be entitled to equal opportunity and the equal protection of the law, with miscegenation as the inevitable concomitant.

This brings up the question of secondary factors, which will be considered a little later. It is important to remember, however, that the social usefulness of any occupation is judged by the total impact of its bearer on his society. If this is kept in mind it will be seen that every argument over equal opportunities is at bottom an argument over social usefulness. A predominantly White society may, for example, deny equal opportunities to a Negro film actor—not because he lacks acting ability but because his appearance in certain normally white rôles might not be considered socially useful. Whether or not this is ethical is not at issue here.

It may of course be objected by evolutionists that the social usefulness of any occupation or activity is indeed a scientifically ascertainable factor, and that the criterion is whether or not it contributes to the survival of the society, race or civilization concerned. Apart from the difficulty of determining what does and what does not contribute to individual or collective survival, it is by no means self-evident that the purpose of civilizations or societies is to survive. Religious societies, for example, have held that their purpose is to praise God. Others have held, and still hold, that their purpose is to be free. In other words, an orthogenetic civilization is just as Utopian as an equal-opportunity civilization.

Dobzhansky does not accept this argument. He maintains (on page 285) that "science tells us" not only what the social consequences of equal or unequal opportunities are, but also that equal opportunities are better—in itself a thoroughly subjective value judgment. Yet in the preceding chapter he asks: "What would be the genetic consequences of an open-class [*i.e.*, equal-opportunity] society?" And he answers: "We do not know nearly enough to answer this question with assurance" (page 248).

The fact is that in point of social usefulness each society is its own supreme if capricious arbiter, from whose judgment there is no appeal. Occupations and pursuits which at this moment and in our own civilization may appear useless or harmful may have been, and may still be elsewhere, eminently useful within their own frame of reference. Dobzhansky admits this implicitly: "Wisely or otherwise, most people prefer self-government even to good government" (page 286).

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In the Middle Ages, for example, it was common for feudal lords to endow monasteries whose inmates were thus enabled to live in relative idleness and security and were expected to devote much of their time to praying for the worldly and otherworldly welfare of their patron. In a materialistic society, such as that of Russia, such pious idleness is laughed at as the height of absurdity and social uselessness; but it was no laughing matter to the feudal lord, who spent much of his time slaying, robbing, jousting, making love, feasting and scheming, and was desperately in need of some sort of vicarious religious reassurance. We may also recall that the quality most sought after in monks and nuns was the capacity of experiencing mystical ecstasy—a capacity which, modern psychology tells us, verged on, if it was not actually, pathological. Similar qualifications were needed by the court jester or the Delphic Oracle. (An interesting account of how a warlord attempted to acquire a court jester by driving a promising lad deliberately out of his mind is found in Grimmelshausen's *Simplicissimus*). But who is to say that the grossly irreverent and irrelevant wit of an innocent fool was not an essential antidote in a society obsessed with relevancy?

In a similar, if more sinister, vein many contemporary psychologists have suggested that Adolf Hitler was a psychopath. Whether or not this is true, it cannot be claimed that Hitler arrived at his eminence by dissembling his gifts and his personality; on the contrary, it was by energetically displaying them that he obtained from his society the highest occupation it had to give.

A gift for magic or sorcery does not bring its bearer high rewards or honors in the United States or Europe, but it is highly esteemed, for instance, by the rulers of Haiti and Ghana. In the terms of their civilizations it is a socially useful gift, and if we dispute this it is our word against theirs.

The import of these brief excursions into strange and familiar civilizations past and present will be clear when we consider that Dobzhansky concedes the likelihood that "yesterday's 'inferior' and 'subject' races" may create civilizations different from those "regarded as quintessences of enlightenment and discernment in Washington and Moscow" (page 286). It happens that both the United States and Russia contain large and unassimilated blocks of those very same stocks to whom our author would concede the capacity for different civilizations and, *ipso facto*, different notions of social usefulness.

Dobzhansky, of course, points out the hypothetical nature of such conjectures by saying that the true cultural capacities possessed by underprivileged individuals or ethnic groups cannot be discovered until they have been given equal occupational opportunities. The obvious rejoinder, apt to be made by the society concerned, is that by the time they have fully used such opportuni-

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ties it may be too late—they may have done away with some feature of the civilization held dear by the formerly dominant group. ("Equality of opportunity also means freedom to choose among existing environments or to create new ones"—page 289). The former argument has in fact been used by high officials of the Weimar Republic who have claimed, though with little success, that they felt the Bohemian Corporal's novel political approach deserved a chance, and that he did not show his supposedly maniacal proclivities until he had absolute power.

The interaction of civilizations and racial stocks brings us to a question touched on earlier, that of secondary factors or capacities. It is inevitable that in the mingling of different civilizations or human stocks ("Genes create the setting for cultural traits"—page 322) there should occur some confusion of meanings, some mislabelling of occupational pursuits. The meaning of "soldier" in the United States and in Latin America, for instance, is ostensibly the same. In reality, soldiering in Latin America, especially in the officer corps, has a decidedly political connotation. Failure to appreciate such secondary distinctions (which may, at bottom, be primary distinctions) leads to confusion and even farce, as when United States military advisers are shocked to see Peruvian colonels use their American training and equipment against fellow citizens to effect a military coup.

The Roman Catholic Church is probably as uniform and universal a civilising factor as was ever imposed on functionaries of diverse ethnic stocks. Yet the opportunities provided by the Church have been used in southern Europe, the dominant center, to resurrect the old Mediterranean Great Mother cult, in Guatemala to ressurect Mayan spirit worship, and in Haiti to revive African sorcery, often through the use of facilities of the Church.

As soon as it becomes apparent to the dominant element of a civilization that equal opportunities, or fairly equal opportunities, are used by an out-group to achieve ends not envisaged by the dominant group, the latter attempts to correct the situation by withdrawing equal opportunities. Thus the clergy of Guatemala, Haiti, and several other Latin American localities populated predominantly by Negroes or Indians, such as northern Brazil, need constant refresher courses by foreign-born priests and monks. With some sophistry it may be argued that the opportunities of the indigenous clergy were found not to be truly equal to those that were available to, say, St Patrick, and that the missionaries are merely trying to equalize them rather than the opposite.

An analogous situation prevails in regard to many other "unassimilated," "underprivileged" or "underdeveloped" groups or societies. One is tempted to paraphrase a well known satire by saying that "all animals are entitled to equal opportunities,

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but some animals are entitled to more equal opportunities than others." At what point does assistance to an "underprivileged" group turn into privilege? At what point is privilege transformed into an obligation and a restriction? As long as experimentation with humans is impractical we can obtain only approximate, conditional answers to such questions.

Dobzhansky's Utopia is really based on a misapplication of an equation which can crudely be represented by three variables: human capacities, restraints or privileges (opportunities), and achievements: $a \pm b = c$. If we make one of these inoperative (restraints and privileges, for example), the other two will then correspond exactly: $a \pm 0 = c$. This, of course, happens to be the formula for anarchy.

Dobzhansky proposes to turn it into a formula for effective human engineering by eliminating restraints or privileges only if a positive (socially useful) achievements factor can be expected. But how do we manipulate restraint or equal opportunity for a civilization, actual or nascent, whose achievement criteria are not "carbon copies" of our own and are therefore beyond our understanding? It is but reasonable to ask Professor Dobzhansky the same question which he, in his book (page 342), puts to other biologists who have proposed Utopian social absolutes: "From where are the criteria of value to come?"

Dobzhansky may object that all this is abstract splitting of hairs, and that his proposal is much more immediate and practical, and aims merely at providing equal opportunities within the framework of existing societies. But it is precisely this framework, or system of values, that arouses his dissatisfaction. It also illustrates the pitfalls into which so able and conscientious a biologist as Dobzhansky can fall when he enters the field of philosophy.

SUMMARY

The reasons for pronouncing Dobzhansky's equal-opportunity concept Utopian may be summed up as follows:

1. If freedom from restraint (equal opportunity) is to be granted only to individuals and groups expected to produce socially useful achievements, it is necessary first to define such achievements.

2. Each society—more precisely, the dominant element of each society—defines socially useful achievements in terms of its own historical experience. This definition is necessarily subjective, transitory, and intended to fit the capacities and aspirations of the individuals or groups historically belonging to the dominant group.

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3. Every attempt to re-define opportunities is, in effect, an attempt to re-define social usefulness. Any proposal to equalize objectively opportunities for all individuals and societies on earth presupposes the existence of universally valid definitions of social usefulness. Such a postulate, however, is incompatible with the existence of genetic and cultural diversity, and is therefore Utopian.

Books Received

IMPRESSIONI DI UN ANTROPOLOGO SULLE CULTURE E CIVILTA PRECOLOMBIANE

By Carlo Maxia. Extract from *L'Universo*, Vol. XLII, No. 5, September-October 1962.

IMMAGINI DELLA FINLANDIA

By Giovanni di Giura. Extract from *Rassegna Italiana*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 438, 1961.

THE CHRISTIAN WEST AND THE ARAB WORLD

By Izzat Tannous. The Palestine Arab Refugee Office, New York, 1961. Pp 12.

TABLE FOR THE GENERAL SHAPE OF THE NEGROES' HAIR

By J. R. dos Santos Júnior. Extract from *Trabalhos de Antropologia e Etnologia*, Vol. XVII, Sociedade Portuguesa de Antropologia e Etnologia, Oporto, 1959.

CULTURA, SOCIEDAD Y SALUD MENTAL

By Claudio Esteva Fabregat. Extract from *Revista de la Universidad de Madrid*, Vol. X, No. 37.

CATALOGO GENERAL DE PUBLICACIONES: COLECCIONES Y REVISTAS

Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1962.

DIE ASIATISCHEN PROTO-MEDITERRANEN

By Mario Cappieri. Extract from *Ethnographisch-Archäologische Zeitschrift*, Vol. II, No. 2, 1961.

A GENETIC SURVEY AMONG THE RIANG: A MONGOLOID TRIBE OF TRIPURA

By N. Kumar and D. B. Sastry. Extract from *Z. Morph. Anthrop.*, Vol. LI, No. 3, 1961.

HYGIENE AND MEDICAL PRACTICES AMONG THE ONGE (LITTLE ANDAMAN)

By Lidio Cipriani. Extract from *Anthropos*, Vol. 56, 1961.

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Book Reviews

BEHAVIOR GENETICS

By John L. Fuller and W. Robert Thompson. John Wiley and Sons, New York and London, 1960. Pp. 396, many figures and tables. Price $9.00 : 72s.

This book is written by John L. Fuller, a Senior Staff Scientist and Assistant Director of the Roscoe B. Jackson Memorial Laboratory at Bar Harbor in Maine, and Professor W. Robert Thompson, Professor of Psychology at Wesleyan University. It sets out to explore the relationship between heredity and behaviour. The publishers draw attention to the fact that there has long been controversy in both scientific and lay circles concerning this relationship, and the surprising thing is that, despite this, there is a very small quantity of scientific literature available on the subject.

The authors claim that their aim is not to support doctrinaire points of view—presumably on the question of the potency of heredity and environment. But, in fact, their work does support the great importance of the rôle of heredity—and it is difficult to see, with all the vast amount of information which we have of a *prima facie* nature, how it could be otherwise, despite any paucity of published research of an experimental character. Thus, after discussing behaviour in dogs, the authors say (p. 218): "It may be concluded in general that the work on strain differences supports the conclusions reached by the method of selection. Both point definitely to heredity as an important determiner of intelligence and learning in animals."

It may be observed, incidentally, that the Shetland collie, a breed which has become highly specialised for specific limited tasks, "appeared to be relatively poor on many variables, whereas wire-haired fox terriers were best on tests which seemed to call for confidence in strange situations" (p. 218). This is exactly what one would expect. The fox terrier's usefulness is of a much more generalised nature than the collie's, and so the former breed is able to cope with more varied situations. But this ability to deal with such situations is not due to the effect of teaching (that is, environment) being more potent, but merely to the fact that the heredity is more responsive to varied situations than that of a breed which has been bred for one thing only—the handling—and how superb it is!—of sheep, as will be seen on any Scottish hillside, where the dog and the shepherd work in complete unison handling scores of sheep.

Dicussing human attitudes and interests, the authors say (p. 235): "It is likely as in the case of attitudes that heredity plays a minor rôle in the transmission of interests. The degree to which a son follows in his father's footsteps will be determined by a large number of environmental factors. Some of these will be sociological, such as the degree of vertical mobility in the society; others will be purely psychological, such as the kind of child-rearing practices extant in the home." Such a statement, however, needs to be taken with considerable reserve. It is true that in the case of work and careers which do not require marked specialised skills all these factors will influence choice. But this has no bearing on establishing any proof that heredity is not the primary factor involved. Let us consider specialised occupations—such as those of musicians, artists, or even mathematicians. A son cannot elect to be a musician and earn his living by his music unless he has music in him in the first instance—it must be inherent. Anyone can be taught to translate more or less

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mechanically the notation on paper on to the keys of an instrument, but that is not playing music, and such work would not give anyone anywhere the basis of a livelihood. No matter how musical may be the society in which a young man or woman is reared, no matter what the opportunities in the society for musical development, no matter the hours of practice at the instrument prescribed by music masters, the pupil will fail to respond satisfactorily unless musical ability is there in the first place. Indeed, as one who had just that sort of education, without any musical aptitudes then or now, this reviewer can say, speaking from experience, that there is something much more important than these environmental factors. If, therefore, it is not in our environment then it is in our genetic inheritance, or in our stars, or both, but it cannot be sought in any other direction. It is in the study of the inheritance of specialised ability and the practice of specialised crafts and callings that the test as to whether heredity is an issue lies, and not in general vocations which do not require such specialised talents.

Despite the failure of the authors to make these important reservations at this point, and although they go out of their way to say that environmental effects are not negligible, they do state (p. 260): "We have now covered the main body of work, both at the human and animal levels, dealing with the inheritance of personality and temperament. The evidence is strong that heredity plays a large part in the determination of a great many kinds of traits in a wide range of species. Studies in many kinds of behavior such as projective test responses, interest patterns, tempo, aggressiveness, fearfulness, and timidity all point to this general conclusion."

This view is inconsistent with their statements on race and class differences (pp. 323-324) where, relying on Dobzhansky and Ashley-Montagu in the main, they come down with the quite extraordinary statement that while "strains of animals show behavioral differences correlated with their diversity in genotypes, and it can be argued that the same must be true of human races," nevertheless "there are reasons to discount the likelihood of such differences being very important." Then follows this particularly inept statement: "The most diverse human cultures have common features related to the perpetuation of the species. It is difficult to conceive of a society in which intelligence, cooperation, and physical vigor would not have positive selective value. Hence it is likely that natural selection tends to oppose the establishment of major heritable behavior differences between races."

This mighty obiter dictum could be applied to animals as well as man since intelligence, co-operation and physical vigour all have positive selective values, and yet the totality of the authors' work is to show that marked differences of heredity occur, as in the instances we have cited in reference to dogs. How then is man any different as far as these very laws they have cited are concerned? Again, even if all the races started level in the battle of natural selection, it is a fact that some races lead the field and others lag behind. Furthermore, the laggards are just those who have always had the very environmental conditions in which it is easiest to erect civilisation (which is, as far as we are concerned in this instance, the standard of difference taken to illustrate difference); and the other stocks, now leading the field, had to come into or approach the geographical regions where these environmental conditions are found in order to get the start they now have! Then again, if we take the authors' point that most diverse human cultures have common features related to the perpetuation of the species, have not animals these also? Are not all animals geared to a development which is designed to perpetuate their species if they can? If man has these characteristics also they do not prove, rather they disprove, that differences exist between one stock and another.

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In one paragraph only these authors have vitiated a study of weighty proportions, commanding considerable respect. We can only suppose that it has been put in to make the three official Kow Tows to the prevailing Egalitarian God and his Dogma—for the book has, with only slight exceptions, avoided the subject of race throughout its 396 otherwise ably written pages. What is even more remarkable is that the authors admit in the very next paragraph that although "there is great overlap in the intelligence-test scores of individuals from different social classes, there are real differences in average performance on various psychological tests. . . . In view of the strong evidence for the heritability of intelligence (Chapter 7) and the occurrence of assortative mating with respect to intelligence, it is possible that some social-class differentiation exists with respect to genetic factors affecting intelligence, and this divergence may increase if social-class membership becomes more dependent upon competitive effort in a society with high social mobility." If within the one stock there can be sorting out (as may be commonly observed in any society where there has been time for this to occur), so that there are different levels of intelligence and aptitude between one class (or caste) and another, despite considerable overlap, then how can such differences be avoided between races? Take, for instance, the Nordic, as an extreme type of the Caucasoid race, nurtured in the tundra and the northern Eurasiatic homelands, and the Bantu, living in hot equatorial countries. Their problems are entirely different, and the characters required for survival are different. The very energy which the northern stock must exert consistently over millennia would destroy them in the equatorial region. Consequently, differences of intelligence and different types of intelligence and temperament must have evolved—and that is what all our common experience shows us we have today when we look at any markedly different racial stocks. It is consistent with all studies of intelligence both among men and animals, and so commands acceptance; and arguments advanced to refute such powerful evidence must rest on an extraordinarily high basis of experimental proof, such as has never yet been attempted or conceived.

That the authors realise they are placing themselves in an impossible situation is shown by their apologia which follows in the next paragraph: "These opinions regarding race and class differences may appear to be contradictory. The point is that natural selection in man operates at the level of whole societies. Intelligence is necessary for survival of a society, but it is not necessary that all members of the society be superior, and in fact a complex society has niches for its dullards as well as its geniuses. The less able members of a society benefit from association with the talented leaders. Natural selection should effectively prevent the evolution of a race of morons, but it would not eliminate them from a society which had a need for unskilled workers."

This is quite pathetic coming from two brilliant research workers, whose book could have been recommended as something really worth while except for this incursion into a field about which they appear to know very little indeed, and which prudence should have cautioned them to ignore. They seem to fail to distingush the fact that ancent society was one in which there was not the marked difference of social classes whereby the moronic was permanently segregated. A moronic segment in any people evolving during the Ice Ages simply could not be carried—for in such conditions they cannot even carry their sick or the old folk. Those not intelligent enough to survive simply do not. Therefore the whole argument which is put up to explain their contradiction breaks down.

To conclude, while deploring this attempt at minimising racial differences, we acknowledge that *Behavior Genetics* is otherwise useful and impressive—indeed, judiciously read, it establishes the very opposite of the

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point of view expressed by the authors in these passages to which we have taken exception. We hope the book will be sufficiently well accepted to see another edition wherein the authors will show more discretion and less dependence on the theories of a narrowly based group of egalitarian tub-thumpers, the introduction of whose views has placed them in a hopelessly unintelligible position.

R. GAYRE OF GAYRE.

FERNE VOELKER, UMWELT UND KULTUR BEI SECHS NATUR-VOELKERN

By Kaj Birket-Smith. Orell Fuessli, Zürich, 1958. Pp. 200, many illustrations. Price S.Fr. 17.85.

The world renowned Danish ethnologist, Kaj Birket-Smith, celebrates in this work perhaps his greatest triump. The presentation is of a popular science nature, although based on solid scientific foundations. The illustrations are excellent and the bibliographies are exhaustive. All in all we have here an excellent companion volume to Dr Birket-Smith's universally recognized work *Primitive Man and His Ways* (1960), which like the present book has been translated into several different languages from the original Danish.

BERTIL LUNDMAN *trans. Donald A. Swan.*

ANTHROPOLOGY A TO Z

By Carleton S. Coon and Edward E. Hunt. Grosset and Dunlap. New York, 1963. Pp. 277. Price $2.50.

This book brings together into one volume a vast amount of knowledge respecting man's origins and evolutionary history, his distribution into races, and the biological and psychological aspects of human behavior. The authors are the distinguished physical anthropologists, Carleton S. Coon and Edward E. Hunt. Based on the work of several eminent German scientists, especially Eugen Fischer and Franz Weidenreich, the book contains essays on human growth, paternity diagnosis, constitution, social biology, racial psychology, paleontology and serology. An especial debt is owed to Weidenreich who in 1947 advanced the hypothesis of racial differences later elaborated by Coon in his *The Origin of Races* (1962).

Of the essays, the reviewer found those on cultural anthropology, the history of races, and racial and social biology most valuable. Materials contained in the essays on genetics and demography are excellent, but are readily available elsewhere. The authors do a good job of presenting social anthropology as a scientific discipline. This area has too often been represented by popular writers as a series of anecdotes, sometimes of doubtful validity.

The essay on the history of races includes excellent pictures of 31 human stocks from North European to Neo-Hawaiian. The authors classify *homo sapiens* into five main groups with many sub-races often difficult to classify. In a short essay on racial psychology the authors discuss mental testing, the existence of aptitudes and special talents in various races, and differences in personality traits. The treatment of intelligence testing in the U.S.A. is, on the whole, quite fair though far too brief to be entirely accurate. Studies of twins and of families are considered as offering the best evidence of the large genetic component

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in mental test scores. Differences in stature and of intelligence in various social classes are not attributed solely to environment as is too often the current custom. Assortative mating and differences in reproductive rate and mortality are fairly evaluated. But the heredity components are not neglected.

The book is highly recommended to the general reader and to those scientists not expert in the topics covered.

HENRY E. GARRETT.

MAN IN NATURE

By Marsdon Bates. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1961. Pp. 116. Price $1.75.

This volume can be welcomed in spite of the very modestly expressed negativism which is evident in the small section on race psychology. In this book a leading American zoologist describes with great pedagogical skill the origin, evolution and development of man, and his interaction with his (predominantly biological) environment, in the light of the most modern research results. Especially worthy of emphasis is the superior, completely firm grasp of planning and development of the book. Also praiseworthy is the clear—even amusing—language, which shows how American popular science can be when it is at its best. This book should be translated into other languages.

BERTIL LUNDMAN, *trans.* DONALD A. SWAN.

DESPOTISM: A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF TYRANNY

By Dagobert D. Runes. Philosophical Library, New York, 1963. Pp. 269, many plates. Price $12.50.

On page one of *Despotism* is a 1939 picture of Joseph Stalin in a theatrical handshake with a smiling Joachim von Ribbentrop "confirming his agreement with Hitler to simultaneously attack Poland by air and land, and to divide its land and people between themselves." Three hundred and eighty pictures and two hundred and sixty-three pages later the book ends with a picture of the Czarina Catherine above the caption "royalty par excellence: exploitative, erudite, erotic." These two pictures bound a story the theme of which is perfectly clear—tyranny. Since there is no chronological or etiological order to the book, it is not in chapters. Instead there are thirty-four unnumbered sections each with a topical heading. Example headings are: "The Lies of Yesterday," "Liege and Leech," "Inequitable Equality," "The Blight of Slavery," "The Legacy of Poor Jesus," "The Nymph of Petersburg." If it were a coloring book, and it could well be with seventy per cent of its pages printed in gray, most of its instructions should read, "color it bloody, or sad, or lost." In an unusual way the book creates the impression that the species has suffered more than it has profited throughout the ages and that it has not really progressed at all.

Runes, a Doctor of Philosophy who has written and edited many books and journals on subjects varying from dictionaries to devils, man, contemplation, and God, depicts in *Despotism* the suffering of the masses rather than the glory of the few who have been selected by historians as the heroes of progress. This different picture of history shows the *victims* of "the usurpers and imposters, the treacherous nobles and kings of the realm, the avaricious foes of the citizenry, the power schemers who stalk

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the public arena and masquerade as the workers' defenders, while they aim at the scepter over the proletariat." His thought in exposing the despots is that a good look at the past may allow a precise vision of the present. It just might.

The reviewer is of the opinion that the meek and the weak have always known they were being victimized by the lustful, the greedy, and the powerful, and that that knowledge did not enable them to achieve redress. So likewise he thinks that a precise knowledge of what is going on at present is unlikely to change man's inhumanity to man. Runes himself says as much in a commentary on Catherine II, ". . . a highly educated person. Her life and deeds, however, prove conclusively that knowledge in itself is not a virtue, and talent alone not a blessing, unless they are guided by a feeling for humanity." The real problem is how to get that feeling for humanity. It may be impossible as long as more food, more clothes, more sex and the like are more highly motivating than less of any of these things in the determination of strength of habit, power, and aggression. The end of strife is not yet in sight.

JOHN B. WOLFE.

ESSAYS ON THE DEATH PENALTY

Edited by T. Robert Ingram. The St Thomas Press, Houston, Texas, 1963. Pp. 138. Price $1.95.

In this little book seven distinguished men, all ministers of religion but one, argue cogently for the retention of the death penalty for capital crimes. The importance of the book lies not solely in its discussion of this specific topic. Its contribution to this reviewer lies in its criticism of the weak sentimentalism which regards all law breakers as "sick" persons to be wept over rather than punished.

The book is edited by T. R. Ingram, a minister of the Protestant Episcopal Church, who contributes an essay, "The Keystone of Our Penal System." This keystone, Dr Ingram believes, is the death penalty upon which our Christian civilization has been built. Dr C. S. Lewis, Professor of Mediaeval and Renaissance English at the University of Cambridge, in an essay entitled "The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment," holds that humanitarianism removes the threat of punishment from the law and the courts (where it belongs) and puts it in the hands of presumed experts who often do not even accept such categories as rights or justice. The Rev. E. L. H. Taylor, an Anglican priest, in his essay, "The Death Penalty," argues that punishment and retribution are just penalties for sin in the Christian tradition. Moreover, he gives figures to show that abolishing the death penalty does not act as a deterrent: in fact, that the murder rate for England (which has the death penalty) is only one half the rate for Sweden which abolished it many years ago.

The Rev. G. Aiken Taylor, a minister in the Presbyterian Church, believes that to the Christian "Capital Punishment [is] Right and Necessary"—the title of his essay. The Rev. Jacob J. Vellenga, a Presbyterian, bases his argument for capital punishment on the Scriptures in his essay, "Is Capital Punishment Wrong?" and the Rev. W. A. Barrett, a Baptist deacon, also supports the idea of just punishment for sin by numerous quotations from the Bible.

The essay, "Medicine or Morals as the Basis of Justice and Law," by the Rev. E. L. H. Taylor, is in the reviewer's opinion the cream of the collection. Dr Taylor is familiar with the psychiatric approach to anti-social behavior. He chides the extremely socially minded person who protects and coddles the vicious criminal, and whose sympathies go to the

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killer rather than to his victim. On page 95, in answer to so-called "liberal" writers who argue that those who oppose them are mentally ill, he writes: "In terms of such a definition, a person cannot be considered to be healthy and well adjusted unless he or she has first discarded all Christian moral standards, believes in a socialistically 'planned economy' and a totalitarian world government." The last essay, "A Bible Study," is by Gervas A. Carey, a Quaker and former college president.

This collection of essays should be read by all "liberals." It represents the thinking of kindly but realistic men who believe that man is responsible for his actions and should be held accountable by society.

HENRY E. GARRETT.

VOELKERKUNDE

Edited by Herbert Tischner. Fischer Bucherei, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1959. Pp. 370, many illustrations. Price DM 3.60.

The Anglo-American scientific world at present lacks an applicable, modern specialized volume in ethnography (*Voelkerkunde*) which studies different peoples (*Voelker*) as separate entities. This book, however, is such a work. It is in the same excellent series of small handbooks as *Anthropologie,* by Gerhard Herberer, Gottfried Kurth and Ilse Schwidetzky. The Editor, who is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Hamburg, has attempted to describe briefly, but as comprehensively as possible and in a very readable manner, the primitive peoples of the entire world.

The 26 articles were contributed by nine different scientists, some of whom enjoy world renown, as for example the Editor himself, and above all Professor Kunz Dittmer. In spite of apparently limited space, the latter is the author of an exceptionally well prepared article containing much new material about Africa. Also of special prominence is the Editor's fine article about the South Seas—in which Heyerdahl is not named at all! Unfortunately, the sections on South-east Asia suffer from being divided too much into several smaller articles. *Voelkerkunde* contains nearly 100 superb illustrations and an excellent bibliography and index. It is a work which is very much to be recommended.

BERTIL LUNDMAN, *trans.* DONALD A. SWAN.

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At no time in our history has the need for higher education been greater: at no time has the demand been more insistent, or the requirements more exacting. The scope and content of many aspects of scientific learning has more than doubled in the course of a generation; and with the growth of science a corresponding efficacy in the processes of general and humane education has become essential.

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All contributions will be most gratefully acknowledged, and full information on the University's needs and plans, with advice on methods of contributing, will gladly be sent on application to the Secretary to the University, Old College, South Bridge, Edinburgh, 8.

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